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I. INTRODUCTION
If the International Criminal Court (ICC or “Court”) does not
transform political and social realities on the ground, then why
bother? This question, repeatedly offered by those disenchanted by
the Court’s work, 1 is part of a pedigreed critique of international law,
harking back to legal realist broadsides against natural law and
positivist approaches a century ago. 2 It is not enough that law is
moral, the argument goes, it must also perform in a way that is
measurably good or positively transformative. The outlook that
international law should be judged based on its impact is almost
hegemonic today, at least in the United States. 3 One variant of this
outlook, the political realist critique, is particularly resonant. In this
article, we begin by tracing how this critique is applied to the ICC.
Political realists toggle seamlessly between arguing that the Court is
unnecessarily political, and arguing that the ICC should be more
politically engaged.
We then spend the bulk of the article constructing a pragmatist
response to this challenge. Accepting that the ICC is inevitably
political, we move toward a measured assessment of its impact. We
extensively analyze both qualitative and quantitative data on the
relationship between the ICC and two outcomes: the prevention of

1. See, e.g., David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1
Billion,
2
Convictions,
FORBES
(Mar.
12,
2014),
http://www.
forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years1-billion-2-convictions-2/ (asking if the less-than-intended results of the ICC are
worth the millions of dollars spent annually); see also Elizabeth Peet, Why is the
International Criminal Court So Bad at Prosecuting War Criminals? WILSON Q.
(June 15, 2015), http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/why-is-the-internationalcriminal-court-so-bad-at-prosecuting-war-criminals/ (stating that the international
judicial process may actually hinder the healing process for war-torn nations).
2. Contra OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (2009)
(suggesting that law cannot be unwavering like the law of mathematics, but
evolves throughout history); see Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and
International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260, 262 (1940) (listing four reasons how a
positivist school of jurisprudence was historically important).
3. See Guglielmo Verdirame, “The Divided West:” International Lawyers in
Europe and America, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 560-61 (2007) (stating that while
American scholars are perpetuating the use of empirical models to quantify the
effectiveness of international law by referring to work by other American scholars,
the larger international community is skeptical on the reliance of such
methodology).
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conflict and domestic legal change. Ultimately, we determine that the
ICC is almost undoubtedly associated with improved conditions in
the world, but this is not yet due to its general capacity to
successfully intervene in states. Instead, the ICC has an impact
because it performs beneficial social and legal functions in
international politics.

II. THE POLITICAL REALIST CRITIQUE
Tensions between law and politics lie at the heart of the ICC
mission. The principle of complementarity and the referral system
resulted from political compromise among state delegations. This is
no secret. 4 What remains open for debate is whether the Court
behaves politically. Because the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is
independent and exercises discretion, it must necessarily balance
uniform standards of international criminal law with the “interests of
justice” in particular countries. 5 Rooted in this fact, political realist
critiques of the ICC make three different moves. The first is to argue
that the ICC is caught in a law-versus-politics paradox. If the Court
makes decisions solely on legal standards, it risks doing harm in
situations ill-suited for judicial intervention. Yet, if the Court makes
decisions infused with political judgment, it becomes “too
pragmatic,” loses objectivity, or becomes a tool of selective justice. 6
4. See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 68-72 (2008) (explaining that while the ICC has broad potential
jurisdiction, its actual jurisdiction is severely limited because of the need to respect
state sovereignty); see also DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A
PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 163-65 (2012) (reflecting
upon the difficult negotiations to decide whether the United States would sign the
Rome Statute).
5. The Prosecutor does not have unlimited discretion. It is very difficult, for
example, for OTP to suspend or ignore a case referred by a state parties or the
Security Council. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, VOL. 1: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND
INTEGRATED TEXT OF THE STATUTE, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 168-70 (2005) (stating that the Prosecutor has many
institutional limitations that may risk the feasibility of an investigation); see also
Kenneth A. Rodman, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 99, 120 (2009) (explaining that the Prosecutor does not have unlimited
discretion because it is very difficult, for example, for OTP to suspend or ignore a
case referred by state parties or the United Nations Security Council).
6. See Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case
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The law-versus-politics paradox is a familiar refrain in work on the
ICC: 7 How could the Court sit in neutral judgment of political
behavior if it behaves politically?
Some critical theorists are satisfied simply to conclude their work
after identifying this problem. Others follow with a second move,
which is to demonstrate that, faced with the law-versus-politics
paradox, the Court favors consequentialist over normative reasoning.
Investigative researchers argue that the ICC’s first prosecutor, Luis
Moreno Ocampo “chased” the Court’s early cases in Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, making secret deals to prosecute
only rebels in exchange for government self-referrals. 8 Moreover, the
Prosecutor made this decision because it would gain the ICC access
without damaging any vital interests of United Nations Security

Selection in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in COURTING
CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE, AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37, 44 (Nicholas Waddell &
Phil Clark eds., 2008) (exemplifying the precarious balance of prosecuting through
ICC jurisdiction over domestic jurisdiction in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Northern Uganda); see also Celestine Nchekwube Ezennia, The Modus
Operandi of the International Criminal Court System: An Impartial or a Selective
Justice Regime? 16 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 448, 450 (2016) (arguing that the ICC
does not meet the requirement for impartiality and needs reform because it can be
manipulated by powerful countries). For interests of justice, see generally Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
7. See Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the
International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 80-81 (2004); see also
Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 507-08 (1999); see also Leslie
Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 277 (2016); see also Edward M. Wise, The
International Criminal Court: A Budget of Paradoxes, 8 TULANE J. INT’L COMP. L.
261, 265 (2000) (introducing that the ICC faces paradoxes including trying to
enforce “universal law” which would diminish state sovereignty); see generally
Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, 171
WORLD AFF. 23 (2009) (explaining the foundational origins of the ICC).
8. Phil Clark, Chasing Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State Referral in
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 1180
(Carsten Stahn ed., 2010); DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 101 (2014); Alana Tiemessen,
The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions, 18 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 444, 452 (2014) (describing that the selective cooperation of countries
like Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo with the ICC as “politicized
justice”).
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Council (“Security Council”) members. 9 These early Court-building
measures coincided with numerous United Nations (UN) official
statements linking justice to the prevention of conflict and deterrence
of atrocity crimes. 10 For many lawyers, showing concern for impact
taints the purity of the Court; for political realists, this is proof that
ICC supporters cannot be pure normative standard-bearers. Instead,
Court legalists are awash in politics, and they are very much
concerned about the consequences of law. 11
A third and opposite move is made by a different group of political
realists. Instead of arguing that it is guided by outcomes, this group
attacks the ICC and its supporters for being too legalistic. They
contend that the Court ought to be more concerned about
consequences because the Court’s actions are counterproductive. A
large body of social science and journalism is predicated on
identifying the short-term negative unintended consequences,
potential or real, of the ICC’s judicial interventions. 12 According to
9. BOSCO, supra note 8, at 101 (clarifying that ICC deputy prosecutor Serge
Brammertz left American officials of the US embassy in Congo convinced that the
ICC would promote the unity government by only targeting militia leaders who
remained outside the peace process).
10. See Justice and the Rule of Law: The Role of the United Nations,
AMNESTY INT’L 2-3 (Sept. 29, 2004), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
ior40/014/2004/en/ (stating that the Council stressed the importance of keeping
individuals accountable for committing crimes against the international community
to facilitate international peace); see also Press Release, General Assembly,
General Assembly President Says Permanent International Criminal Court Will
Provide Much Stronger Deterrence Than Ad Hoc Tribunals, GA/SM/282-L/T/4367
(April 11, 2002) (emphasizing that a permanent international criminal court would
promote international peace by giving potential criminals a clear warning that there
was no place to hide).
11. See also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6-8
(2013) (advocating for the idea that in order to examine how human rights are a
basic norm, scholars must look to politics); see generally Adam Branch, Uganda’s
Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS INT’L AFF. 179, 179-80
(2007) (considering the political effects the ICC has as it becomes politicized, as
an agent of global law enforcement).
12. See Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities? 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 816-17 (2006)
(arguing that international criminal tribunals in weak states with ongoing military
tribunals would be counterproductive); see also Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri,
Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,
28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 40-41 (2003) (describing the positive effects of international
criminal trials in transitional states that are often not felt until the subsequent
generations support global norms); see also Branch, supra note 11, at 190-91
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one such account by Goldsmith and Krasner, the ICC and other
international institutions are “discouraged from engaging in
assessments of costs and benefits that are often so important for the
prevention of human suffering. As a result, such institutions may
worsen rather than alleviate human rights catastrophes.” 13 They
follow that the ICC inspires counter-mobilization by political actors
or armed combatants who do not want to be prosecuted for atrocity
crimes. The ICC would ignore the risk of “backlash” at its own peril.
Political realists began warning about backlash before the Court
officially formed on July 1, 2002, 14 and they have continued since. 15
Reactions to the political realist critique and its consequentialist
challenges to the ICC differ. The deontologist response is to argue
that the ICC should retreat to strict norm enforcement, and insulate

(exposing issues with ICC intervention through the example of the conflict in
northern Uganda with the Lord’s Resistance Army); see also Kenneth Anderson,
The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences,
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 332 (2009) (pointing out that international criminal law
has brought both anticipated and unanticipated consequences); see generally Jack
Goldsmith & Stephen Krasner, The Limits of Idealism 123 DEADELUS 47, 48
(2003) (listing four fundamental flaws of the new theory of idealism in
international relations).
13. See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 62-63 (underlining that the
severance of the link between norm enforcement and political accountability can
discourage institutions from “engaging in the assessments of costs and benefits that
are often so important for the prevention of human suffering”).
14. See David Rieff, Court of Dreams, THE NEW REPUBLIC 16, 16-17 (Sept. 7,
1998) (suggesting that despite the ICC’s good intentions, there is now less respect
for international law); see also Stephen Krasner, A World Court that Could
Backfire, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/
opinion/a-world-court-that-could-backfire.html?_r=0; see also Robert Tucker, The
International Criminal Court Controversy, 18 WORLD POL’Y J. 71, 79 (2001)
(reasoning a primary complaint of the ICC is the erosion of sovereignty and
speculating politics should precede the law because law is dependent on political
order).
15. See ‘Dark Day for Justice,’ says ICC Prosecutor, Dropping Charges
Against Kenyan President, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Dec. 2014), http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=49529 (validating concerns in part by the African
Union’s recent challenge to ICC authority, premised on the fact that the
“neocolonial” Court had opened investigations only in African situations in its first
decade of existence”); see also ICC Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes
Inquiries, BBC (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30458347
(quoting Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda that the Security Council’s stalemate on
Darfur “can only embolden perpetrators” and that the Security Council needs to
change its approach for arresting Darfuri suspects).
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itself from political concerns over impact. 16 In this sense, it accepts
that law and politics should remain separate spheres. In this article,
we pursue an alternative, pragmatist response. First, we embrace the
law-versus-politics paradox. That the ICC works at the intersection
of legal and political spheres is not a novel discovery, nor is it unique
to the ICC. 17 Martii Koskenniemi reminds us that international law
lurks in a liminal space between apology and utopia, or between the
concrete realities of state practice and aspiration for normative
change. 18 All courts must negotiate this space between legal and
political spheres, as is evident from the very open and cynical
maneuvering by political parties to seat judges on the Supreme Court
of the United States. But the ICC is particularly prone to criticism on
this front compared to national courts because it is a newer
institution, and because it must appeal to a much wider and more
diverse audience consisting of 124 state parties; influential nonratifiers of the Rome Statute like the United States and China; and
countless lawyers and political scientists that analyze the Court’s
every move. 19 It seems unreasonable to reject the ICC wholesale

16. See Tomer Broude, The Court Should Avoid all Considerations of
Deterrence and Instead Focus on Creating a Credible and Legitimate Normative
Environment in Which Serious Crimes Are Not Tolerated, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 194, 200 (Richard H.
Steinberg ed., 2016) (advocating that crime prevention is much broader than
deterrence and is beyond the mandate of the ICC).
17. Those who have worked closely with international tribunals are fairly open
about the political compromises they must make. See SCHEFFER, supra note 4, at
164-65 (conceding those who have worked closely with international tribunals are
fairly open about the political compromises they must make).
18. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 6, 7 (1990) (asserting that international law is only independent from politics if
it can distance itself from theories of natural justice and if it can distance itself
between theoretical and actual state behavior); see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 23 (2006) (reiterating that states believe there can be a separation
between how things are and how they should be).
19. Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National
Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 437, 454 (2013); see Robert Sloane, The
Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39,
94 (2007) (“International criminal tribunals must develop coherent, fair, and
principled sentencing practices, for their long-term success depends in part on the
extent to which the social institution of punishment can be shaped to reflect,
pursue, and in time, one hopes, justify their substantial costs”).
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because it is caught between all of these actors in a divided world.
Second, we do not take the political realist critique as entirely
objective or predictively accurate. Political realists often claim
scientific neutrality when passing judgment on international law,
while in actuality they are promoting ambiguous normative
alternatives. 20 For example, the same scholar might challenge
legalists for being inattentive to consequences, only to later claim
that the Court advocacy is based too much on consequentialist
thinking. 21 This creates a moving target for judgments of the ICC
without supplying an alternative advocacy. Political realists also
make predictions that are far off the mark, or that do not bear
empirical fruit. For instance, it hardly seems the case that the ICC
has directly caused any particular human catastrophe, as Jack
Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner predicted in 2003. 22 It is also hard to
divorce this “prediction” from the alarmist outlook of its authors,
American sovereigntistes writing in the early 2000s. 23 Finally,
political analysts tend to make errors in their handling of critical
legal and procedural details related to Court operation. Political
scientists have argued that the ICC exercises universal jurisdiction,
and others have written that African leaders voted themselves
immune from the ICC in 2014. 24 Neither fact is true. 25
20. Geoff Dancy & Christopher J. Fariss, Rescuing Human Rights law from
Legalism and its Critics, HUM. RTS. Q. 8-9 (forthcoming 2017); see Leslie
Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Law and Politics in Transitional Justice, 18 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 303, 305 (2015) (“Seemingly legalistic proponents of strict criminal
accountability are often astutely pragmatic in their attempts to increase the
autonomous scope or law in the politics of transition.”).
21. Cf. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 7 (2003)
(finding that policies based on the logic of consequences are most likely to prevent
war crimes and crimes against humanity); but see Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence,
Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice, 24 ETHICS INT’L AFF. 191,
193 (2010).
22. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (2003) (speculating that the ICC will discourage the United
States from engaging in activities that protect human rights, thereby increasing the
impunity of those who violate human rights).
23. For an explanation of “sovereigntistes,” see Seyla Benhabib, Claiming
Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic Sovereignty,
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 692 (2009).
24. Nicola Perugini & Neve Gordon, The Threat of Human Rights, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/nicola-
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Biases and inaccuracies drive home the point that legal analyses
almost always will involve political judgment, or will enter the realm
of politics. 26 Therefore, with respect to the ICC, the question should
not be whether the Court is political, but how it is political. What are
its political impacts? We review a wealth of new empirical research,
and conduct additional analyses of quantitative and qualitative data,
to assess the ICC’s work to date. While there is good new evidence
on individual attitudes about the ICC—indicating that victims are
often frustrated by procedure and lack of feedback, but also that
roughly 60% of respondents from 56 countries continue to support
the Court—perceptions are not our primary focus. 27 Instead, we
orient our analysis toward the issues of violence prevention and
domestic legal change.
We make two contributions. The first is to show that the ICC is
associated with modest declines in repression, civil war, and mass
violence, but these relationships are not necessarily attributable to the
actual involvement of the ICC in particular situations. They are
attributable to standard-setting functions that the Court plays in
international political society. Second, we examine whether the
Court is laying the foundations for future change at the domestic

perugini-and-neve-gordon/threat-of-human-rights; see Vinjamuri, supra note 7, at
276 (clarifying after the African Union discussed the possibility of withdrawal
from the ICC, it voted to allow immunity of the Court’s jurisdiction for current
heads of state over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
25. The ICC exercises a combination of national (active personality) and
territorial jurisdiction, and African leaders voted themselves immunity to the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, not the ICC. See WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 74-75 (2d
ed. 2004); see also Monica Mark, African Leaders Vote Themselves Immunity from
New Human Rights Court, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2014/jul/03/african-leaders-vote-immunity-human-rightscourt (observing that African leaders voted to give themselves immunity in front of
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, not the ICC).
26. See JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS
142-43 (1986) (opining that law is a form of political action).
27. See The Victims’ Court? A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the
International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. CTR. 3-4 (2015), https://www.law.
berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/VP_report_2015_final_full2.pdf
(advocating that victims’ support of the ICC depends on where they are located,
and that victims tend to value more convictions, including in lower-level cases);
see also JAMES MEERNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND HUMAN SECURITY ch.
5 (2016).
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political level, and find that the ICC produces unexpected and
influential changes in domestic legal systems. The Court also
encourages legal activism in measurable ways. In our discussion of
conflict prevention and legal change, we pay close attention to the
impact of the ICC across different stages of countries’ involvement
with the Court, including ratification, preliminary examination, and
investigation. With this, we bridge legal research with newer
political science research on ICC impact.

III. PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
Our first task is to examine whether the ICC prevents violence.
The preamble to the Rome Statute specifies that agreeing state
parties are “determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such
crimes.” 28 This utilitarian justification for trials is found in all
international tribunals’ statutes. 29 As shorthand, the idea of puniter,
ne peccetur (punishment so there will be no crime) is often referred
to as deterrence. 30 Rooted in a rationalist approach to national
criminal law, deterrence theory assumes that would-be criminals
conduct a cost-benefit calculation to assess the utility of each
criminal act. The more certain, severe, and swift the punishment, the
less likely an actor will commit a crime. 31 In national contexts,
criminologists find little concrete evidence in support of deterrence
theory. What evidence they do find suggests that the most important
deterrent factor is the perceived certainty of punishment. 32

28. Rome Statute, art. 53.
29. See James Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and
the Apprehension of ICC Suspects, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 169, 175-76 (2013)
[hereinafter Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace] (including in the charters of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, in addition to the ICC).
30. The other justification for prosecution is punitur, quia peccatum est
(punishment because there has been a crime). See Martin Mennecke, Punishing
Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not? 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 319, 339 n.2 (2007).
31. Tom Buitelaar, The ICC and the Prevention of Atrocities: Criminological
Perspectives, 17 HUM. RTS. REV. 285, 289 (2016).
32. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence? 100 J. CRIM. LAW. CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818-19 (2010) (concluding
that the perceived certainty of punishment is more important than the perceived
severity, in almost every deterrence study to date).
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When applying deterrence logic to the ICC, theorists are mostly
skeptical. 33 They come away making one of two arguments: the
futility thesis or the perversity thesis. 34 The futility thesis simply
posits that the ICC will have no impact on actors’ calculations. One
reason is that individuals considering atrocity crimes are exceptional.
They are already risk-acceptant or highly influenced by ideological
motives, and they are unlikely to be swayed by the possibility of
future punishment at an international court. 35 Another reason is that
punishment by ICC is highly improbable, not particularly severe, and
dreadfully slow. 36 It thus violates the conditions necessary for
deterrence conceived in rational-choice terms.
The perversity thesis is grounded in a tension between justice and
33. Accord David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476-77 (1999). For a review of
the literature, see Mennecke, supra note 30, at 323-24 (confirming there is no
empirical evidence to prove that potential criminals are deterred by the threat of
prosecution); see also Buitelaar, supra note 31, at 293 (finding that the
expectations of the ICC to promote peace and prevent humanitarian crimes appear
to be largely unmet); see also Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to The Hague,
149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 112 (1995) (reasoning that the effect of deterrence is
lessened by factors including religious hatred, xenophobia, and fanatic patriotism).
Accord MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 52
(2007); see Sloane, supra note 19, at 75; see also Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn
L. Rothe, The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of
International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
771, 781 (2010); see also Victoria E. Collins & Dawn L. Rothe, The International
Criminal Court: A Pipe Dream to End Impunity? 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 200
(2013); see also Meernik, Justice, Power and Peace, supra note 29, at 176-77; cf.
MARTHA MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND
REPAIR 22 (2002) (offering that while it is too much to expect international
criminal prosecutions to effect deterrence, the prosecutions can serve as means to
force accountability and defy forced forgetting); see generally Miriam J.
Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 43 (2002) (challenging the
assumption that prosecution is the best method to redress criminal actions).
34. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY,
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 7 (1991) (introducing the perversity and futility theses).
35. See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 12, at 807 (using coup participants in Africa
as an example as other high-risk individuals who commit humanitarian crimes who
will not likely be deterred by prosecution by international criminal tribunals).
36. See Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal
Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL
JUST. 1, 21 (2013) (considering that there may not be a deterring effect from
prosecution because of the Court’s particular selection of prosecutions, and the
comparative lack of certainty and sanctions).
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peace. The ICC aims to deter atrocities because such crimes
“threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,” and it
often pursues investigations in situations of ongoing conflict. 37 As a
result, analysts commonly blend the terminology of deterrence with
rationalist arguments about the peace-making potential of
international tribunals. Chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg Tribunal
Robert Jackson spoke on the connection, or lack thereof, between
tribunals and prevention of war: “Wars are started only on the theory
and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal punishment, to
be suffered only in the event that the war is lost, will probably . . .
not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the war-makers
feel the chances of defeat are negligible.” 38 The decision to engage
with or refrain from war-fighting is made prior to any decision about
punishment.
This logic is often extended to the ICC. Proponents of the
perversity thesis argue that following ICC involvement, hardened
war criminals, will have two choices: (1) negotiate an end to conflict
and subsequently being punished for atrocities committed during the
war, or (2) digging in to fight to the bitter end, Following this
rational-choice train of thought, critics contend that the ICC might
actually encourage leaders to choose option two and continue
fighting. 39 Thus, a perverse and unintended consequence of ICC
involvement is longer wars.
The futility and perversity theses contradict one another. Where
the first assumes that ICC action is non-costly for actors considering
atrocity crimes, the second assumes that ICC threats are costly
enough to inspire combatants to fight harder. 40 How might one
resolve this tension? The first step is to realize that the highly
rationalist deterrence theory fueling the futility thesis is just an
intellectual model, and its concept of “cost” might have little basis in
reality. Research on mass violence suggests that leaders choose lethal
options because they are politically strategic 41; however, their
37. Rome Statute, pmbl.
38. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 153-54 (1947).
39. See Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court
Deter Atrocity? 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 446 (2016).
40. We are not the first to notice this. See id.
41. See Steven C. Poe, The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical
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strategic decisions are not necessarily rooted in a meticulous
calculation of material costs and benefits. Dictators and violent
rebels are at times surprisingly sensitive to social and normative
pressure, even when it is not backed by a high probability of
sanction. 42 These leaders have short time horizons, they remain
preoccupied with their status in international society, and they fret
over their historical legacies. 43
Being targeted by the ICC brings with it a kind of international
opprobrium that is virtually unparalleled. As such, the Court could
serve an expressive role as “shamer-in-chief” in world politics,
multiplying the impact of media reports or transnational activism. 44
Approach to the Research on Human Rights and Repression, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: NEW SYSTEMATIC STUDIES 23, 23 (Sabine C. Carey
& Steven C. Poe eds., 2004) (arguing that leaders chose repression techniques
based on perceptions of strength). See also BENJAMIN VALENTINO, FINAL
SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 2 (2004)
(suggesting that mass killings begin with specific goals and strategies of high
political and military leaders, not with broad social or political factors).
42. ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, 1980-2000 78-79 (2008) (exploring China’s seemingly non-rational
engagement with security institutions starting in the 1980s); see Matthew Krain,
J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of
Genocides or Politicides? 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 574, 576 (2012) (explaining the
decline in violence following naming and shaming the perpetrators of the genocide
during genocidal episodes); see also HYERAN JO, COMPLIANT REBELS: REBEL
GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS 13-14 (2015) (advocating
that compliant rebels emerge when they seek the legitimacy of their movement and
their movement recognizes the importance of international law).
43. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 110 (2009); Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 13-14;
RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-51 (2013).
44. See Sloane, supra note 19, at 70-71 (explaining that “punishment is a
conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation,
and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the
punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is
inflicted”); see also Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming:
Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD.
Q. 1, 13-14 (2012) (adding shaming Human Rights Organizations can have a
“powerful impact on basic physical integrity rights” when the shaming is
combined with domestic Human Rights Organizations and/or intergovernmental
organizations, third-party states or individuals outside of the regime); see also
Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, in 6 MAX PLANCK
UNYB 1, 9-10 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (explaining the
role of the ICC in creating a “moral community.”).

DANCY- FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS (DO NOT DELETE)

658

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

2/23/2017 12:35 PM

[32:3

This idea could go some way toward explaining why leaders, faced
with only a low probability of actual trial punishment, alter their
behavior: they care about how they are perceived. Leaders agonize
over being indicted by the ICC, despite the fact that 39 indictments
have produced only eight convictions in the first 14 years of the
Court’s operation. 45 In Uganda, being sent to The Hague “weigh[s]
heavily on Kony’s mind,” and reports suggest that he is an expert on
ICC procedure. 46 In Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were
concerned enough after their arrest warrants to launch an all-out
propaganda offensive against the Court. 47 Even in non-signatory
states, leaders fear the ICC. Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa, former
president and leader during the bloody and crime-ridden last
offensive against the Tamil Tigers, publicly rails against the
possibility of ICC indictment—perhaps not even realizing that his
crimes are technically outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 48 And in
bizarre diatribes in 2014, President Kim Jong-un of North Korea,
another non-ratifier of the Rome Statute, called for “merciless
sledge-hammer blows” against those who perpetuate the “political
fraud” of criminal trials at the ICC. 49
While the ICC has not fared well in these political showdowns, the
examples go some way toward answering the repeated question,
“Who’s afraid of the International Criminal Court?” 50 Apparently, a
45. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situations.aspx?ln=en# (last visited June 17, 2016).
46. BOSCO, supra note 8, at 129.
47. See Chandra Lekha Sriram & Stephen Brown, Kenya in the Shadow of the
ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact, 12 INT’L CRIM. LAW REV. 219, 22627 (2012); see also Owen Bowcott, ICC drops murder and rape charges against
Kenyan
president,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
5,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/05/crimes-humanity-charges-kenyapresident-dropped-uhuru-kenyatta; see also Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the
International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law, 8 J. E. AFR.
STUD. 25, 26 (2014).
48. See Abdul Ruff, Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa Headed for War Crimes Tribunal?
ASIA SENTINEL (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/sri-lankarajapaksa-war-crimes-tribunal/.
49. Anna Fifield, North Korea response to ‘plot-breeding’ U.N. report gets
even weirder, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2014/11/28/north-korea-response-to-plot-breeding-u-nreport-gets-even-weirder/.
50. See generally David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal
Court? FOREIGN AFF. (May 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-
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lot of leaders are. Fear of the ICC from camps with only the remotest
possibility of punishment is not strictly rational from the perspective
of deterrence theory, but this represents a deficiency in deterrence
theory, not in the operation of the ICC. The futility thesis likely
underestimates the social costs that the ICC creates. 51
The second step in resolving the tension in arguments over
deterrence is to realize that the perversity thesis is focused on
specific deterrence, not general deterrence. Specific deterrence is
“[t]he possibility that prosecutions can deter leaders who have
already committed war crimes or crimes against humanity from
committing them in the future.” 52 However, proponents of the
perversity thesis contend that, if the ICC creates humiliating social
costs, ostracized leaders could lash out with violence in response to
Court attention. Indeed, the fact remains that ICC intervention has
failed to deter repeated violations by actors who have already labeled
war criminals. Examples abound in situation countries like Sudan,
DRC, Uganda, and Kenya. Stopping actors already complicit in
atrocity crimes is extremely difficult, even when interveners are
endowed with substantial coercive power.
Judging the ICC strictly on whether it can end ongoing violence is
perhaps an unfair standard, though one still worth considering. 53
However, this should not be the only measure of the Court’s effects.
In focusing on specific deterrence, the perversity thesis shows a blind
spot. It does not consider whether the ICC exerts a general deterrent
effect, preventing violent acts committed by new actors. 54 Analyzing
04-18/whos-afraid-international-criminal-court (discussing the ICC’s reputation
and its impact on the international community, arguing that the ICC is struggling to
find its international footing. The article generally discusses the successes and
failures of the ICC).
51. See Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 450-51.
52. Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of
International Crimes by Government Leaders, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://old.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrenteffect-of-the-icc.html.
53. Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to
Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS.
Q. 624, 625 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Akhayan, Are International Criminal
Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?]; Payam Akhavan, The Rise, and Fall, and
Rise, of International Criminal Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 527, 529-30 (2013)
[hereinafter Akhavan, Rise, and Fall, and Rise].
54. See DRUMBL, supra note 33, at 61-62 (providing instances of specific and
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such an effect is very difficult because it requires that one “measur[e]
success by what does not happen.” 55 For this reason, most empirical
scholars have shied away from a critical examination of general
deterrence.
This brings us to the third and final step in addressing the debate
on the ICC and deterrence. One of the only ways to draw inferences
about conflict prevention is to compare a wide range of data. Crossnational analysis can help us see what is not apparent in specific case
studies. Performing large-scale comparative analysis requires careful
attention to the different kinds of claims linking the ICC to the
prevention or promotion of violence. This means distinguishing
between two distinct phenomena that are often lumped together. The
first is the ability of the ICC to end ongoing wars. Terminating wars
requires not deterrence, “[w]hich is aimed at dissuading someone
from initiating proscribed behavior, but rather compellence, the act
of preventing someone from continuing actions on which he has
already embarked.” 56 The second is the ability of the ICC to stop new
violence from erupting. The latter does require deterrence. In the
remainder of this section, we examine whether ratification of the
Rome Statute or active involvement of the Court in a situation might
reasonably alter prospects for either compellence or deterrence.

A. COMPELLING AN END TO VIOLENT CONFLICT
Ending conflicts, specifically long-lasting ones, requires acts of
compellence, wherein one side is convinced to cease armed combat.
This can occur in one of two ways. Either one side gains a fighting
advantage overwhelming enough to force surrender, or both sides
decide to bargain rather than continue to fight. Ending war means
removing fighting capabilities or making accommodation more

general deterrence).
55. Payam Akhavan, Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does
Not Happen, 22 CRIM. L. FORUM 1, 23 (2011) [hereinafter Akhavan, Preventing
Genocide].
56. Kenneth Rodman, Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 HUM.
RTS. Q. 529, 531 (2008) (opining the threat of prosecution is unlikely to deter
because, “by the time a tribunal asserts jurisdiction, large-scale crimes have
already taken place and in most cases . . . responsibility lies with top political and
military leaders,” and “. . . attaching legal liability does not create an incentive to
refrain from criminal activity.”).
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attractive than fighting. How might the ICC assist in either of these
processes?
1. Ratification
State commitment to the Rome Statute cannot itself make a
fighting side stronger or marginalize an armed opponent. Therefore,
we should not expect a relationship between ratification and
compellence through coercion. That said, ratification might still
affect compellence. State commitment to the Rome Statute can assist
governments in making credible commitments to highly suspicious
rebel opponents that want to bargain but do not trust the government.
This “hand-tying” logic is explained by Beth Simmons and Allison
Danner: “The willingness of a government to subject itself to the risk
of prosecution sends an important signal to a government’s
adversaries as well as the broader public that there are boundaries in
quelling future threats beyond which the government will not go.” 57
The need for outside sources of hand-tying like commitment to the
ICC is especially necessary in countries with little domestic rule of
law. If no one trusts the rules of the game, governments seek to
establish trust by outsourcing norm enforcement to the international
community.
Simmons and Danner find evidence of this pattern in the fact that
non-democratic and low rule-of-law countries with recent
experiences of civil war ratify the Rome Statute at a higher rate than
other countries. 58 As a member of the Sierra Leonean delegation
expressed to the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties, “. . .we can attest
first-hand to the crucial role of international criminal justice in
ending conflict and restoring public confidence in the country and its
future.” 59 The authors also discover that low-credibility ratifiers are
more likely to experience a termination in civil war, defined as at
least a one-year cessation of hostilities. 60
57. Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 234 (Spring 2010).
58. See SCHABAS, supra note 25, at 75 (noting how “astonishing” it was in
2000 and 2001 that the “very States expected to steer clear of the Court because of
their obvious vulnerability to prosecution started to produce instruments of
ratification.”).
59. Simmons & Danner, supra note 57, at 237.
60. Id. at 253.
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a. Negotiated Settlements
The most comprehensive evidence on civil war is collected by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (“UCDP”), which registers every
episode of violent conflict between a state and a rebel group that
results in at least 25 battle deaths. 61 Using the UCDP data set, we
find a correlation between ICC ratification and the prospects for a
negotiated settlement in civil war states. Of all “dyadic” conflict
episodes, involving state forces and a single rebel group, 69 were
fought in states that ratified the Rome Statute. 62 Out of those, 15
ended in either a ceasefire or negotiated settlement (22%). This may
seem low, but when statistically compared to the 214 conflict
episodes that occurred in non-ratifying states since 1998, we find that
conflicts in Rome-ratifying states are 8% more likely to end in a
negotiated settlement. 63 This is certainly a small effect, but one that
is statistically significant.
b. Amnesties
Ratification may slightly improve the chances for negotiation, but
it could also make final peace settlements more difficult to reach.
One reason for this is that state governments and mediators may
interpret state commitments to the Rome Statute as removing the
option of amnesties to opposition groups. Amnesties are often
thought to be a useful carrot for luring rebels to the negotiating table
because they provide legal protection against prosecution in
exchange for the promise to demobilize. 64 Although no systematic

61. UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, http://ucdp.uu.se/ (providing an
interactive map of armed conflicts).
62. See Lotta Harbom et al., Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 19462007, 45 J. PEACE RESEARCH 697, 706-09 (Sept. 2008) (providing dyadic conflict
data). We code data on Rome Statute ratifications ourselves using the United
Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org (last visited Jun 15, 2016).
63. To calculate this probability, we run a bivariate logit model predicting a
negotiated termination with a binary measure indicating whether the conflict takes
place in a country party to the Rome Statute. The model employs robust standard
errors clustered by country. We then calculate the change in the predicted
probability of a negotiated settlement for conflicts in Rome-ratifying states versus
non-ratifying states.
64. See Andrea Armstrong & Gloria Ntegeye, The Devil is in the Details: The
Challenges of Transitional Justice in Recent African Peace Agreements, 6
AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 7 (2006).

DANCY- FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/23/2017 12:35 PM

FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS TO LAW IN POLITICS

663

research demonstrates a concrete relationship between amnesties and
the achievement of peace—the most optimistic places the “success
rate” of amnesties at 34% 65—conflict management experts avidly
defend the utility of amnesty offers. 66
The emerging duty to prosecute under international human rights
law and international criminal law is in clear tension with the
sovereign right to amnesty armed combatants. 67 For this reason,
amnesties became a hot-button issue in the former Yugoslavia, where
negotiations to end the conflict coincided with the operations of the
fledgling ad hoc tribunal. 68 Similarly, at the negotiations for the
Lomé Peace Accord to end the war Sierra Leone in 1999, UN
mediators hurriedly appended a note clarifying the UN’s opposition
to blanket amnesty after the agreement was already signed. 69 Though
the UN position is to resist the issuance of blanket amnesties,
international law technically does not ban them, and whether the ICC
can recognize national amnesties is an open legal question. 70 Still,
65. RENÉE JEFFERY, AMNESTIES, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10910 (2014).
66. Stephan Sonnenberg & James L. Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build
Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights, 39 WASH. UNIV.
J.L. & POL’Y 257, 265 (2012) (sharing models for conflict resolution in
international conflicts and sharing that those involved in conflict resolution should
encourage communities to make their own decisions for conflict resolution,
including providing amnesty).
67. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2552-53 (1990) (citing
that although “international law generally establishes rights and duties between and
among states, international criminal law imposes obligations on individuals
making them liable to criminal punishment,” thus putting duties on states to follow
international law where local law may grant amnesty); see Lisa Laplante,
Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice
Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 931 (2009) (highlighting how the tensions
between international human rights treaties and national amnesties allow for
ambiguities over what international law definitively states about amnesty).
68. Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249,
250 (1996); Felice D. Gaer, UN-Anonymous: Reflections on Human Rights in
Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 6-7 (1997).
69. See infra Part IV.
70. See MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE 75 (2009) (asserting that neither the Rome Statute nor its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence make reference to amnesties); see also Kieran McEvoy &
Louise Mallinder, Amnesties in Transition: Punishment, Restoration, and the
Governance of Mercy, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 410, 415 (2012) (highlighting the growing
scrutiny and legal challenges faced by blanket amnesties); see also Scharf, supra
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purveyors of the perversity thesis argue that the involvement of the
ICC and other legalists into situations of ongoing conflict will
remove the amnesty option and make it more difficult to induce
rebels to negotiate. 71
The suspicion that Rome ratification makes amnesties less likely is
an unproven one. No research has examined the correlation between
Rome Statute commitments and the propensity for governments to
pass amnesty laws. In Figure 1, we depict the number of amnesties
that have been offered to rebels in 154 different conflict dyads since
1998. To do so, we use the same dyadic civil war data from UCDP,
but we also add information on amnesties available from the
Transitional Justice Research Collaborative (“TJRC”). 72 For this
chart, we count the number of amnesties extended to each rebel
opponent in a country (some countries have more than one group to
fight against), and sum together all of those amnesties passed in
Rome-ratifying and non-ratifying states. Figure 1 shows that among
the 121 different violent conflicts that took place in 40 non-ratifying
states, 68 amnesties were passed. Among the 33 conflicts that
occurred in 15 Rome-ratifying countries, 26 total amnesties were
passed. The percentage of conflicts with amnesties in Rome-ratifying
countries (79%) is higher than the percentage in non-state parties
(56%). On the basis of this data, it cannot be reasonably concluded
that being a party to the ICC prevents governments from offering
amnesties.

note 7, at 521 (asserting that there are frequently no international legal constraints
on the negotiation of amnesties); see also Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute,
Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 293, 297 (2004) (positing that an ongoing challenge for the ICC and
interpreters of the Rome Statute will be whether national amnesties immunize their
recipients from prosecution).
71. Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 12, at 20 (affirming that criminal tribunals
did not deter subsequent atrocities and did not contribute to bringing peace in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda); Vinjamuri, supra note 7, at 196 (arguing that while
international tribunals may complicate negotiations, they ultimately complement
the attempts to reconcile warring parties and promote peace); Vinjamuri & Snyder,
supra note 20, at 304 (declaring that some proponents of amnesties think amnesties
are necessary inducements for rights-abusing parties).
72. Harbom, supra note 62, at 700-04 (presenting dyadic conflict data from
across the world between 1964 to 2014); see Geoff Dancy et al., The Transitional
Justice Research Collaborative: Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide with
New Data, (2014), www.transitionaljusticedata.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
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Figure 1. Total Amnesties Passed During Conflict Between 1998 and
2010 73

The evidence presented in Figure 1 is probably not welcome news
for norm entrepreneurs who want to live in a world where fewer war
combatants are legally protected from prosecution. Nonetheless, the
fact is that amnesties continue to be a mainstay of the conflict
environment, and the higher percentage of amnesties among state
parties to the ICC may be a response to heightened concerns about
the possibility of prosecution. 74 However, in terms of the debate over
the ICC’s ability to end conflict, this is important evidence to take
into account. Rome-ratifying states are slightly more likely to compel
the termination of armed opposition through inducements to
negotiate.
2. ICC Involvement
The discussion over state commitment through ratification only

73. Dancy et al., supra note 72.
74. Louise Mallinder, Amnesties’ Challenge to the Accountability Norm?, in
AMNESTY IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: COMPARATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69, 81 (Francesca Lessa & Leigh A. Payne
eds., 2012) (finding that amnesties remain in common use despite the creation of
the ICC; further asserting that the number of amnesties in 2003, the year after the
creation of the ICC, was almost double the average number of annual amnesty
enactments and was the largest annual total enacted in any year).
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covers one possible link between the ICC and compellence. The
other link involves the triggering of ICC jurisdiction, starting with
preliminary examinations and following with full investigations.
These two steps, which together we call “ICC involvement,” create
interesting possibilities for compellence because they introduce the
risk of prosecution. ICC involvement brings the threat of coercion,
and even if this threat is minimal due to the considerable difficulties
the ICC has in apprehending suspects, it might alter the strategic
calculations of various conflict actors. Protective of their claims to
legitimacy, those targeted by ICC indictments want to avoid the
material cost of being summoned or arrested by the Court, but they
also want to avoid the tarnish of being labeled a war criminal by the
international community. 75
There are two ways in which ICC involvement could change the
strategic conflict environment. The first is that it inspires actors
under threat of future prosecution to seek a bargained solution to the
conflict. After the Court begins a preliminary examination of a
situation, armed combatants will find themselves operating in the
“shadow of the Court.” 76 Thus, their strategy must change to
incorporate the chance that potentially abusive battlefield actions will
attract international legal scrutiny. Rather than taking this risk,
combatants could demobilize. Colombia is a fitting example of this
possibility. According to a report by the Human Rights Consortium
in 2011,
[t]he prospect of prosecutions before the ICC has played directly into the
dynamics of the armed confrontation, including the recent demobilisations
of right-wing paramilitary groups. Various high-level initiatives are being
undertaken by the government to avoid Colombian military officials and
their civilian counterparts being brought before the ICC, and the left-wing
guerrilla groups equally appear to be engaged in damage-limitation

75. See JO, supra note 42, at 13-14 (noting that rebel groups may comply with
international norms in order to enhance their own legitimacy in the eyes of the
international audience).
76. See Éadaoin O’Brien, Par Engstrom & David James, In the Shadow of the
ICC: Columbia and International Criminal Justice, HUM. RTS. CONSORTIUM 1, 9
(2011) (summarizing that the preliminary examination has raised the specter of
prosecution before the ICC and provoked intense debate among armed groups).
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measures. 77

If this demobilizing potential is generalizable, we should observe
a relationship between preliminary examination and the end of
violent conflict.
Less attentive combatants may not pay heed to ICC involvement
until they are targeted by a full investigation. As Eric Fish argues,
“. . . it seems unlikely that guerilla warlords who operate in rural
Africa, such as [Joseph] Kony, would have heard of the ICC before
being indicted by it.” 78 These leaders, who suddenly discover they
are targeted for arrest, could seek to bargain in order to eliminate the
threat of prosecution. This seems to have occurred in Uganda.
Following the release of his arrest warrant in 2005, Joseph Kony met
with Jan Egeland on the border between Uganda and Congo. Kony
“apparently told Egeland that he wanted the ICC warrants lifted as a
condition for entering the formal talks.” 79 Uganda President Yoweri
Museveni approved of this idea, and he attempted to bargain away
the arrest warrant in order to achieve a negotiated settlement at the
Juba talks held in July 2006. The dilemma, of course, is that the
Prosecutor faced the “ex post problem.” 80 Having no legal discretion
to suspend the arrest warrant once it was issued, he had to resist
Kony’s amnesty. This put the ICC in the position of obstructing the
terms of the peace settlement, which eventually broke down. The
Court then received blame for getting in the way of peace. 81
This case raises a number of unknowns regarding Kony’s
motivations. For one, it is possible that the only reason Kony agreed
to discuss terms in the first place was his worry over being targeted
by the ICC, meaning that the ICC was critical in producing the initial
77. Id. at 10.
78. Eric S. Fish, Comment, Peace Through Complementarity: Solving the Ex
Post Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions, 119 YALE L.J. 1703,
1710 (2010).
79. BOSCO, supra note 8, at 129.
80. Fish, supra note 78, at 1707-08 (exposing Museveni’s attempts to
negotiate with Kony; further asserting that the ICC’s lack of discretion creates an
“ex post problem” where the ICC is forced to prosecute war criminals even in
cases where doing so causes more harm).
81. Branch, supra note 11, at 184 (opining that the court’s intervention
disrupted the Ugandan peace negotiations by eviscerating the amnesty offered to
the rebels).
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impulse to negotiate. A second possibility is that Kony never had any
intention of reaching a deal with the government, and that he used
the ceasefire and the Juba talks to delay so that his forces could relocate and rearm. He had followed this course in previous
negotiations. 82
We cannot be sure of Kony’s true motivations, but the effect of the
arrest warrant is clear: it led to the LRA’s marginalization. Writing in
2005, Payam Akhavan contended that the referral set in motion a
change reaction:
Sudan has been persuaded to end its support of the LRA, culminating in a
March 2004 Protocol allowing Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF)
to attack LRA camps in southern Sudan. This unhindered access has
measurably weakened the LRA’s military capability, encouraged
significant defections among LRA commanders, and forced otherwise
defiant leaders to the negotiating table. 83

Still, much has changed since Akhavan wrote his hopeful
assessment. Kony fled to the Congo, where he has remained
ensconced, free from arrest. The LRA began fighting again in
October of 2008—against a formal coalition of governments
including Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan. That low-level
conflict eventually subsided in late 2011, but erupted again in
October 2013. 84 Low on allies but hard to kill or capture, Kony
continues to produce violence, though with much less devastation
than in the early 2000s.
The case of the Uganda referral is one of mixed impact. How one
reads the situation will depend on one’s outlook. However, we may

82. See CHRIS DOLAN, SOCIAL TORTURE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN UGANDA,
1986-2006 57 (2011) (asserting that Kony’s failure to sign the final agreement in
April 2008 created doubts about whether any of the potential protocols would be
realized); see also BOSCO, supra note 8, at 128-29 (speculating upon the way in
which ICC involvement correlated with increased contact between the LRA and
the Ugandan government, as well as Kony’s worries about the ICC during his
meeting with Jan Egeland).
83. Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission
of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
403, 404 (2005).
84. UCDP, Replication Datasets, v. 1-2015, 1946-2014, http://www.pcr.uu.se
/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/.
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look to other cases in Africa for additional evidence of ICC
involvement and marginalization. In the DRC, researcher Michael
Broache suggests that Bosco Ntaganda’s surrender to the ICC in
March 2013 contributed to the dismantling of the M23 rebels:
After Ntaganda’s surrender, over 750 combatants loyal to him fled to
Rwanda, and over 240 more surrendered to the UN disarmament program
in DRC. M23 also lost important financial and material support from
communities in northern Rwanda. . .Ntaganda’s surrender to the ICC thus
significantly weakened and incapacitated M23 and contributed at least
marginally to its eventual defeat. 85

Of course, this is only the end of the story. In 2008, the DRC
government apparently promised not to enforce an earlier ICC arrest
warrant against Ntaganda, in exchange for an agreement to integrate
his former rebel group, the National Conference for the Defense of
the People (“CNDP”), into the state military. Still, after M23
defected from this arrangement in June 2012, the DRC government
used a newer ICC arrest to marginalize Ntaganda and defeat the
rebellion. 86
These ICC warrants have also been used to marginalize opponents
in Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire. After François
Bozizé took power in CAR in a 2003 coup, he sought to neutralize
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, leader of the Mouvement de Libération
du Congo (“MLC”). Bemba had allied with CAR’s former president
Ange-Félix Patassé to put down the coup. When Bozizé succeeded,
he cooperated with the ICC to target Bemba. The ICC issued an
arrest warrant in June 2008, and Bemba was quickly transferred one
month later. Bozizé thus rid himself of a political opponent, and the
ICC obtained control of a militant who became the Court’s third
conviction in March 2016. 87 In Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane
Ouattara pursued a similar strategy when he cooperated with the ICC
85. Michael Broache, Beyond deterrence: the ICC effect in the DRC, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/
michael-broache/beyond-deterrence-icc-effect-in-drc.
86. See id.
87. See Courtney Hillebrecht & Scott Straus, Who Pursues the Perpetrators?
State Cooperation with the ICC, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 18 (forthcoming February
2017), https://courtneyhillebrecht.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/final_icc_
cooperation_hillebrecht_status.pdf (highlighting how Bozizé used the ICC to
remove a political opponent).
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to indict his political rival, former president Laurent Gbagbo. This
strategy of using the ICC to attack armed and political opposition,
which Hillebrecht and Straus inventively dub the “international legal
lasso,” appears prevalent in the Court’s African cases. If it is
generalizable to all ICC involvement, we should observe a
relationship between investigations and government victories in
violent conflict.
Thirty-seven armed dyads have fought in the shadow of ICC
involvement. They stop fighting for one of three reasons:
negotiation, victory, or low activity. Twenty-one of thirty-seven
(57%) conflicts end in low activity, basically meaning that each side
stopped battling in the absence of a formal agreement. Nine cases
ended in victory, and seven ended in a negotiated settlement. These
patterns are mixed, and not robust. When statistically compared to all
other dyadic conflicts, there appears to be no significant correlation
between ICC involvement and the end of fighting. ICC involvement
does not increase the probability and termination in general, nor does
it enhance the risk of a negotiated or victorious end to conflict.
Moreover, ICC involvement does not appear to be associated with
longer or shorter fighting episodes. 88
When it comes to the effect of ICC involvement on the
termination of conflict, we could make one of two tentative
conclusions. The first is that ICC involvement is simply one of many
factors that get incorporated into the dynamics of compellence. As
such, the Court does not exert an independent and measurable effect
when compared to all conflicts. The second is that each case of ICC
involvement is unique and involves a combination of inducement
and marginalization. Neither of these mechanisms is more common
in large comparisons.

88. We perform a series of bivariate logits with robust standard errors
clustered by country. No matter what dependent variable we chose—end of
conflict, negotiated settlement, or victory—a binary variable measuring the
presence of an ICC intervention never achieves significance. To study the duration
of conflict, we perform a Cox model to examine whether ICC intervention is
associated with longer or shorter periods of fighting prior to termination. This, too,
is insignificant.
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B. DETERRING FUTURE VIOLENCE
In the previous section, we find that legal commitments to the ICC
do not reduce the chances for negotiated settlements to conflict, nor
do they prevent Rome-ratifying states from issuing amnesties. We
also present evidence that ICC involvement does in some cases
appear to alter the strategic peacemaking environment, and compel
an end to fighting, but that these impacts are not generalizable. These
findings have two implications. First, the ICC is selectively
incorporated into the political calculations of some leaders some of
the time; however, we cannot pretend that leaders will always engage
the Court the same way. Governments have used the Court to further
their own interests, and they have resisted it when it does not do their
bidding. 89 Short of achieving 100% compliance among the pantheon
of venal politicians in the world, the ICC mission will always be
diluted by these political realities. There is no alternative, but that
does not doom the project to irrelevance. Second, the particularism
of the ICC’s impact on peacemaking means both sides of the peace
versus justice debate are probably overblown. ICC involvement does
not wreck every chance for peace, leading to widespread death and
destruction; nor does it produce unimpeachable justice that cures
violence.
Argument over the peacemaking potential of the ICC may be a
distraction from the Court’s primary mission, which after all, is not
to outlaw all war, but to “outlaw specific violations of the laws of
war.” 90 The Rome Statute traces a more indirect line between Court
activity and peace that is overlooked by theorists studying its on-theground effects amid ongoing wars. The argument of the Statute’s
preamble is that deterring certain acts of brutal violence can
contribute to the long-term resolution of conflict. Populations
victimized by atrocity remain aggrieved for generations. 91 Fewer
atrocities translates into fewer grievances that will, in the future,
89. See Rodman, supra note 56, at 545 (surmising that states withdraw support
from the ICC when it conflicts with domestic interests).
90. Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 445.
91. See Noam Lupu & Leonid Peisakhim, The Legacy of Political Violence
across Generations 20 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.noamlupu.com/
Lupu_Peisakhin_Crimea.pdf (asserting that the degree of political violence against
individual Crimean Tatars had measurable effects on the ethnic loyalty and
resentment towards Russia of their grandchildren).
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erupt into violent contestation over political power. 92 To consider
whether the ICC produces a long-term effect on peace, we must shift
the discussion from compellence to deterrence. Instead of examining
whether the ICC can get actors to stop committing acts they are
already committing, we must examine a far more difficult question:
can the ICC stop actors from choosing atrocity-level violence in the
first place?
Answers to this question nearly always include cherry-picked
anecdotes of severe violence that exist in the world today. The ICC
did nothing to prevent hospital-bombings in Sri Lanka’s final
military assault on the Tamil Tigers in 2009, nor could it stop the
Syrian government from indiscriminately killing civilians in its
attempts to repulse rebels. 93 The ICC does nothing when Boko
Haram ravages villages in the Nigerian countryside, or when the
Islamic State beheads its opponents and takes women as sex slaves. 94
Of course, the statements are true, but the utility of this kind of
“anecdata” in discussions of the ICC and deterrence is limited. 95 To
seriously consider the question, research must systematically
92. See Oskar N.T. Thoms & James Ron, Do Human Rights Violations Cause
Internal Conflict?, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 674, 704 (2007) (positing that discrimination
can create powerful grievances which facilitate the creation of antagonistic groups
and the possibility of collective violence).
93. See GORDON WEISS, THE CAGE: THE FIGHT FOR SRI LANKA AND THE LAST
DAYS OF THE TAMIL TIGERS 89 (2012) (highlighting the occurrence of hospital
bombings during the war with the Tamil Tigers); see also U.N. Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic] (arguing that the presence of opposition
forces does not justify the Syrian government’s indiscriminate bombing of civilian
populations).
94. See West Africa: Regional Boko Haram Offensive, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/west-africa-regional-bokoharam-offensive (describing Boko Haram’s reign of terror against civilian targets
from mid-2009 to 2014); see generally Fannie Lafontaine & Erick Sullivan, And
Justice for All? International Criminal Justice in the Time of High Expectations, in
JUSTICE BELIED THE UNBALANCED SCALES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
219, 221 (Sebastien Chartrand & John Philpot eds., 2015) (highlighting the high
expectations held of the ICC when it was originally formed and the hopes that it
would be able to hold individuals accountable and contribute to maintaining
international peace).
95. See Dancy and Fariss, supra note 20, at 8-9 (criticizing the use of
“anecdata” as a means of judging the effectiveness of the ICC because it misses the
fact that the number of human rights violations are decreasing).
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compare patterns of violence in the world today to a counterfactual
world in which the ICC does not exist.96 Newer social science
research performs these kinds of comparisons, and it discovers that
the ICC does deter certain behaviors.
1. Ratification
Filing an instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute entails a
commitment to abide by certain standards embodied in the
international criminal regime. As such, it can create incentives for
actors under the jurisdiction of the Court to alter their behavior. Early
rationalist treatments were divided on the potential of the ICC to
deter non-compliant behaviors. One article suggested that human
rights violators are so risk-acceptant that the costs created by
commitment to the Rome Statute would not alter their choices. 97
Another employed game theory to demonstrate that wide ratification
of the Rome Statute, by removing exile options for abusive leaders,
“may deter some atrocities at the margin.” 98 However, newer
empirical research seriously challenges both the narrow rationalist
assumptions and the conclusions of this early theoretical work.
First, convincing cross-national evidence suggests that ratification
of the Rome Statute is associated with significant improvements and
government protection of physical integrity rights. Using a simple
and ingenious statistical method called a difference-in-differences
(“DiD”) model, Benjamin Appel compares changes in human rights
protections in ratifying states to non-ratifying states – both before
and after the Rome Statute was available for ratification. In so doing,

96. See generally Kathryn Sikkink, The Role of Consequences, Comparison
and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought, in MORAL LIMIT AND
POSSIBILITY IN WORLD POLITICS 83, 101 (Richard M. Price ed., 2008) (criticizing
counterfactual theorizing from policy makers because of its subjectivity and
inability to be proven definitively).
97. See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 12, at 807 (asserting that human rights
abusers are unlikely to be deterred by the prospect of prosecution and
imprisonment by the ICT because they already accept greater risks such as death
and torture).
98. Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model
of the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935, 937 (2006) (inferring
that the ICC deters human rights abuses at the margins because it provides an
option for asylum-granting states to refrain from offering asylum to leaders who
otherwise might have a means of fleeing retribution in their own countries).
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he is able to account for the fact that some states, like high-income
countries with rule of law cultures, are more prone to ratification
than others. But even when controlling for this screening effect, the
evidence suggests that ratification has an independent causal effect
on state behavior. On this basis, Appel concludes the following:
“While it is true that states that ratify the Rome Statute have on
average better human rights records than nonratifiers, it is also the
case that the human rights practices of ratifiers have improved since
the Court’s establishment. . .” 99
The link between ratification and generally improving human
rights conditions is significant for two reasons. First, violations to
physical integrity, still quite common among state governments, are
not the main focus of the Rome Statute, which aims to combat
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. While certain
acts of violent repression, like torture and arbitrary killing, fall within
these categories, the primary aim of the ICC is not to stop
governments from committing everyday acts of repression. The ICC
takes aim at only “grave” offenses. That Rome ratification decreases
repression more generally should be considered an unintended
positive consequence of Court formation. 100 Second, Appel de-links
the deterrent impact of the ICC from the probability of prosecution.
He contends that the ICC is powerful because it invites judgment
from domestic constituencies and international audiences alike. In
secondary analyses, Appel shows that ICC involvement in a country
increases the probability that that country will be subject to outside
economic pressure, and also that it will experience a change in
government. Knowing this, government officials wise up following

99. Benjamin J. Appel, In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court:
Does the ICC Deter Human Rights Violations?, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 17-18), http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022
002716639101 (finding that the pre-existing differences which may have
contributed to ratification cannot entirely explain the fact that human rights
practices of ratifying states have improved more than the human rights practices of
non-ratifying states since the establishment of the ICC).
100. See Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive
Complementarity: Why International Criminal Court Investigations May Increase
Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 42 (Oct. 30, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2736519
(asserting that the ICC is more likely to involve itself in states with extreme levels
of violence).
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ratification, and improve their practices. Indeed, this could be taken
as evidence that the Court behaves as the “shamer-in-chief” in world
politics, setting standards by which government legitimacy is judged.
Appel’s study dovetails with other research indicating that
ratification of human rights treaties in general, and the Rome Statute
in particular, create domestic social costs for governments. 101 Hyeran
Jo and Beth Simmons argue that the ICC has a deterrent effect not
limited to the costs associated with actual prosecutions; instead, it
serves as a “social deterrent.” 102 Also using a DiD model, and
controlling for a number of other factors, Jo and Simmons find that
Rome-ratifying governments intentionally kill 60% fewer civilians
than their non-ratifying counterparts. 103 This is the case even when
ratifying countries are “matched” and compared to other nonratifying countries in the same region and with the same income
levels. Jo and Simmons’ article has been criticized for focusing too
heavily on governments as opposed to rebel actors, who are the true
threat to civilians. 104 However, the fact remains that only evidence on
the systematic murder of civilians—grave atrocity crimes
specifically within the purview of the Rome Statute—shows that ICC
ratifiers are more respectful of civilians. No evidence to the contrary
has been published.
a. One-sided Violence
Figure 2 depicts yearly incidents of one-sided violence in the
world since 1996, weighted by the number of civilians killed. Acts of
one-sided violence are defined as “the use of armed force by the
government of a state or by a formally organized group against
civilians which results in at least 25 deaths.” 105 In Figure 1, the data
points are sorted by whether the total number of mass-violence

101.
102.
103.
104.

See SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 109-10.
Jo & Simmons, supra note 39, at 449.
Id. at 460.
See Kate Cronin-Furman, Can We Tell if the ICC Can Deter Atrocity?
JAMES G. STEWART (Mar. 21, 2016), http://jamesgstewart.com/author/kate-croninfurman/ (hypothesizing that the conclusion that ratification reduces intentional
violence against civilians is a result of selection effects created by the focus on
state actors in Jo and Simmons’ study).
105. Kristine Eck & Lisa Hultman, One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in
War: Insights from New Fatality Data, 44 J. PEACE RES. 233, 235 (2007).
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incidents that took place in countries not party to the Rome Statute,
versus how many took place in all state parties. The size of the
circles corresponds to how many total civilians were killed in any
particular year. One can observe three basic facts from these charts.
First, the number of mass-killing episodes directed at civilians is
decreasing across the board, though more so for government actors.
Second, the total number of civilians intentionally killed each year
seems to be decreasing as well, though with upticks in recent years.
Third and finally, with the exception of only a few years, the number
of mass-killing incidents that occur in ratifying states is less than the
number that occur in non-state parties. These are the patterns Jo and
Simmons are capturing with their systematic and controlled
statistical analysis. Fewer massacres against civilians occur in states
under the jurisdiction of the Court.
Figure 2. Acts of one-sided violence over time

b. New Wars
State commitments to the Rome Statute are correlated with fewer
violations to physical integrity and fewer incidents of mass killing.
Yet it is also possible that ratification has another effect that remains
unexplored. What if actors in ratifying states are less likely to begin
new civil wars in the first place, for risk of attracting the attention of
the ICC? Figure 3 is a bar chart depicting the number of conflicts
that began in non-ratifying states versus ratifying states since
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1998. 106 Over three times as many civil wars onsets occurred in nonratifying states. By itself, this is not evidence of a causal relationship,
but a statistical significant correlation also exists between state-party
status and the propensity to engage in new civil wars. 107 The
relationship is substantively small but distinguishable from zero.
State parties are 3% less likely to experience civil war onset. When
combined with the empirical evidence presented in this section, one
might reasonably conclude that commitment to the Rome Statue has
at least a marginal deterrent effect on repressive violence, mass
violence against civilians, and civil war.
Figure 3. New wars since 1998

106. Therese Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflict, 1946-2014, 52 J.
PEACE RES. 536, 548 (2015) (presenting a list of dyadic conflicts from across the
world between 1964 and 2014); see generally Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed
Conflict 1946-2001: A New DataSet, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615, 616 (2002) (asserting
that the number of armed conflicts has decreased since the end of the Cold War
and remained fairly stable since 1995, with most conflicts consisting of intrastate
fighting).
107. See Akhavan, Preventing Genocide, supra note 56, at 23 (illustrating a
method of measuring the success of genocide prevention through case studies of
Macedonia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burundi).
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ICC Invovlement

The best evidence available suggests that ratification is associated
with a decline in violence. This is what is referred to as general
deterrence, but what about specific deterrence? Are actors targeted
by ICC interventions less likely to commit atrocity crimes? Again,
anecdata suggests that leaders in ICC crosshairs are willing to
commit human rights violations. Shortly after the arrest warrant for
Kony was issued, he killed six foreign visitors and aid workers,
“forcing aid agencies to cut back their operations in the region.” 108 In
Sudan, when OTP announced it was pursuing an arrest warrant for
President Bashir in July 2008, the regime labeled Luis Moreno
Ocampo a “terrorist” and staged protests against the ICC; when that
arrest warrant was officially announced in March 2009, the
government kicked aid agencies out of the country. 109 These
examples are not encouraging, and there are certainly more examples
of violence in DRC and the Central African Republic following ICC
involvement.
Moving beyond anecdata, systematic research offers mixed
evidence on the question of whether direct involvement by the Court
can serve as a specific deterrent. Using measures that combine both
domestic and international trials, Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink
find that human rights prosecutions targeting state agents associated
with significant declines in average abuses to physical integrity, even
in countries fighting civil wars. 110 Other research counters that
human right prosecutions produce a negative neighborhood effect:
“personalist” dictators in the same region as countries with human
rights prosecutions are 3% less likely to democratize. 111 They hang
108. BOSCO, supra note 8, at 117 (exploring the extent of the ICC’s power to
ensure indicted individuals would appear for trial and concluding that such power
lies with the member states).
109. See id. at 144 (recounting the events surrounding Bashir’s indictment by
the ICC).
110. See Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of
Human Rights Prosecutions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 939, 957-58 (2010) (arguing that
the deterrence impact of prosecutions results from normative pressures and
material punishment).
111. See Abel Escriba-Folch & Joseph Wright, Human Rights Prosecutions and
Autocratic Survival, 69 INT’L ORG. 343, 345 (2015) (assessing the influence of
human rights prosecutions on autocratic regime change in neighboring
dictatorships).
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on to power avoid losing sovereign immunity to prosecution.
These early studies use relatively blunt instruments of
measurement. More nuanced data paints a complex, though at times
hopeful, picture of the specific deterrent effect of international
tribunals. James Meernik argues that the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) operation is correlated
with improvements in the former Yugoslavia: “human rights scores
are generally fairly good in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. Their
citizens’ human rights are not being systematically or substantially
violated, at least since the early 2000s.” 112 The same goes for Sierra
Leone following the operations of the Special Court. However, the
Rwandan government has ramped up human rights violations in
recent years, after a significant decline in violence in the years
directly following the genocide and the formation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Meernik also uses detailed events history data on conflict in Africa
to examine the impact of ICC involvement. He finds that “lethal
repression of human rights protests have increased over time in
several of the states under ICC investigation.” 113 Figure 4 captures a
piece of this puzzle. Using the same one-sided violence data plotted
in Figure 2, this chart counts the number of mass killing events in all
states that have been subject to ICC involvement, sorted by whether
the acts were committed by government forces or by rebels. One can
see that the trend is stable, hovering around ten to twelve such events
each year. Government violence is less frequent but more fatal,
indicated by the size of the data points. The magnitude of
government violence has also not abated over time. One can
conclude that across all countries subject to ICC involvement, there
has been no substantial decrease in violence against civilians. Or, as
Meernik writes, the “ICC appears to have, at best, no impact on these
states.” 114

112. MEERNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND HUMAN SECURITY, supra note
27, at 79.
113. Id. at 97.
114. Id. at 98.
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Figure 4. Acts of one-sided violence in countries following ICC involvement

This “no impact” finding is not universal. Two exceptions are
Uganda and Libya. Uganda features far fewer acts of lethal
repression against civilians than in years past. 115 In Libya, ICC
intervention coincides with a significant decline in “governmentsponsored civilian casualties.” 116 However, the fact remains that the
Court also faces significant obstacles in countries like Kenya, where
in 2013 the public elected an ICC indictee, Uhuru Kenyatta, to the
office of president. Kenyatta then set about intimidating and killing
witnesses, and systematically dismantling the OTP’s case. 117 It is
hard to see how such a situation could be stopped. Until the
international community comes to routinize its support for the Court
in its pursuit of war criminals, and condemn blatant non-compliance
by leaders like Kenyatta, specific deterrence will remain elusive.

115. Id. at 97.
116. Courtney Hillebrecht, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal
Court: Evidence from Libya, 42 INT’L INTERACTIONS 616, 632 (2016) (finding that
ICC actions such as issuing statements and arrest warrants contributed to decreased
violence).
117. See Kenya’s 7-Step Formula for Impunity, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH
TRUTH & JUSTICE (2014), http://kptj.africog.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
Kenyas-Seven-Step-Formula-for-Impunity.pdf (speculating that the Kenyan
government forced the ICC to drop charges against Kenyan President Uhuru
Kenyatta through deliberate, calculated steps).
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C. DISCUSSION
As a whole, the newest research on the link between the ICC and
violence prevention urges us toward cautious optimism. The Court
has not been a resounding success. It has a difficult time building and
completing cases, and it faces the same obstacles as other
multilateral institutions that intervene in conflict states. Like military
or economic interventions, the ICC cannot “solve” problems of local
politics. 118 However, like other international institutions, it can
become enmeshed in local strategic interactions in ways that are
sometimes productive. 119 It can also exert a dampening effect on
violence more generally.
Our discussion thus far yields two important lessons. First, state
commitment to the Rome Statute is associated with positive
outcomes. Contrary to some expectations, Rome-ratifiers are no less
likely to pass amnesties, and they are slightly more likely to end civil
wars with negotiations. Rome-ratifiers are also less likely to be home
to mass violence against civilians, and less likely to experience civil
war onset. This general deterrent effect of state commitment to Rome
is likely due to the social influence of the Court. It serves as a focal
institution in the world of human rights. Fear of being singled out by
the ICC, as opposed to fear of punishment itself, alters the strategy of
leaders worried about their status in the society of states. This should
lead critics who continually advance the futility thesis—that the ICC
cannot create costs and thereby has not deterrent properties—to
reconsider.
Second, ICC involvement in a country, through preliminary
examination or investigation, is not itself positive. In DRC and

118. See Alexander Downes & Jonathan Monten, Forced to Be Free?: Why
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization, 37 INT’L SEC.
90, 130 (2013) (suggesting that removing foreign leaders is unlikely to foster
democracy, intervening in a newly established democracy can safeguard against
autocracy, and taking domestic context into account is key to successful
democratization abroad); see also Reed Wood, “A Hand Upon the Throat of the
Nation:” Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001, 52 INT’L STUD. Q.
489, 508-09 (2008).
119. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 4-6 (2006) (proposing that
the UN is more suited to peace-building through mediation and international
assistance than to imposing policies through force).
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Uganda, ICC presence has played a role in inducing rebels to
bargain, though it also made negotiations more difficult. In
Colombia, ICC preliminary examination compelled paramilitaries
and rebels to demobilize (we return to this case below). In Uganda,
DRC, CAR, and Côte d’Ivoire, political leaders used the ICC to
consolidate power and marginalize opposition; this has at times
contributed to the termination of civil war, though it has done little to
advance norms of accountability. In terms of specific deterrence,
ICC involvement has not made lethal violence less likely in situation
states, though a few cases have seen declines in violence after the
ICC entered the situation.
Another way of summarizing the findings on violence prevention
is this: the ICC is more important for what it is than what it does. As
a standard-bearer, and as “shamer-in-chief,” the ICC influences selfconscious state leaders. As an intervener, it has a mixed record. The
results concerning direct ICC involvement are sobering for Court
supporters. However, observers should also take note that the ICC’s
impact has also not been, on balance, negative. It has not produced
more turmoil. It simply has failed to transform already-violent states
into human rights-compliant states in the short term. This brings us
to a third lesson. Drastic transformation of violent political societies
is probably too high a standard for judging the Court after 14 years
of existence. In the words of Payam Akhavan, commentators may be
“placing a burden on international criminal justice that it cannot bear,
by making it a substitute for, rather than a complement to, preventive
action.” 120
Evidence on conflict prevention indicates the ICC is more
important than observers often assume. An additional matter for
consideration is whether the ICC helps lay the foundations for longterm change—change that has yet to bear fruit in some cases. One
source of long-term change is legal reform. However, save for some
notable exceptions, research has been slow to examine the
relationship between the Court and domestic legal change. As
comparative law scholar Naomi Roht-Arriaza contends, “Often,

120. Akhavan, Rise, and Fall, and Rise, supra note 53, at 530 (using the
examples of the Rwanda and Burundi to show that the first priority in preventing
mass genocide should be prevention, while international criminal justice should be
a response of last resort).
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despite the universal lip service paid to so-called ‘positive’
complementarity, in terms of resources and attention national
prosecutions for international crimes have been seen as somehow
peripheral to the international justice project, but they are integral to
both its origins and its future.” 121 In the next section, we turn to this
question. Is the ICC contributing to productive legal change at the
domestic level?

IV. LEGAL CHANGE
Intrinsic to the Rome Statute project is the notion that the heavy
lifting of providing justice should be done by national jurisdictions.
For that reason, in order to take stock of the Court’s work, we need
to look beyond its deterrence effects to the different ways in which
the ICC may be affecting the legal and political environment at the
local level. 122 In this section, we review evidence on various forms of
domestic legal change. This kind of change could range from the
adoption of new legal rules to a change in the parameters of peace
negotiations or an increase in levels of domestic prosecutorial
activity. These are both legal and political effects; and they are a
product of the availability of the Rome Statute as an international
standard, as well as active promotion by ICC officials.
In what follows, we assess legal changes at the different stages of
ICC involvement in a given country, starting with membership to the
ICC, then move on to preliminary examinations and investigations.
We conclude with cases in which legal changes should be least
likely, those of non-party states. We proceed in this fashion because
we believe it is important that political scientists interested in the
effects of international institutions understand the legal specificities
of a given international treaty. Different ICC stages have specific
legal consequences; they empower ICC officials and domestic actors
differently and generate diverse incentives for stakeholders. As we
121. Naomi Rhot-Arriaza, Just a “Bubble”? Perspective of the Enforcement of
International Criminal Law by National Courts, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 537, 537
(2013) (suggesting that recent developments in the law and corrected expectations
should inform the relationship between national courts and international criminal
law).
122. See id. (examining the shift in focus from international criminal justice
towards national trials in state courts and asserting that resources for national
courts are integral to international criminal justice).
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will show, the ICC produces important legal and political effects at
the national level.

A. RATIFICATION AND LEGAL CHANGE
Legal change should result from ratifying the Rome Statute. Given
the complementarity scheme 123— as well as the different cooperation
requirements for member states like the execution of arrest warrants,
the surrender of individuals and the provision of sensitive
information 124— ratification is expected to create substantial changes
to domestic legal systems. Whether states need to adopt
accompanying legislation in order to implement the Rome Statute in
their national systems depends on each legal system’s relation to
international law. Most of the provisions in the Statute are
considered to be self-executing; that is, they are specific enough to
be applied by domestic courts directly. This is especially true in the
definitions of crimes because the drafters of the Rome Statute
provided definitions of the crimes and state parties agreed to adopt
the Elements of the Crimes. 125 However, even states with monist
systems have found the need to pass some implementing legislation
for matters of cooperation with the Court, especially in relation the
surrendering of individuals and transferring of information. 126
Political science research on human rights treaties rarely pays
attention to implementation, making ratification the variable of
interest instead. 127 However, this is normally not enough to enable
123. See Rome Statute, art. 17 (outlining instances in which the Court should
determine a case inadmissible, including when a state that has jurisdiction over the
case is already investigating or prosecuting it).
124. See generally, Rome Statute, arts. 86-102.
125. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, 405 (2010).
126. See Otto Triffterer, Legal and Political Implications of Domestic
Ratification and Implementation Processes, in THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL ORDERS VOLUME I: GENERAL ASPECTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1-5
(Flavia Lattanzi & Claus Kress eds., 2000) (analyzing the procedural issues
associated with states’ obligation to cooperate with the Rome Statute and asserting
that a step by step approach would be more effective in achieving the Court’s
mission).
127. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002) (focusing on the relationship between human
rights treaty ratification and human rights practices to determine whether countries
comply with treaties and whether these countries improve their human rights
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State Parties to fulfill their obligations to cooperate with the Court’s
proceedings and to exercise jurisdiction themselves. For example, the
ICC has no police force of its own that could arrest suspects; it
requires domestic law enforcement agencies to do so and surrender
them to the Court. 128 In order to comply with this obligation, Canada
had to amend its Extradition Act in order to create a surrender
process to the ICC. The amendment included, among other changes,
the impossibility for individuals subject to a Court request to claim
immunities under law. 129 Empirical evidence shows that
implementation is not automatic. Some states have passed
implementing legislation quickly while others have lagged.
Additionally, while some member states have fully implemented the
Rome Statute, others have only passed complementarity or
cooperation laws, or none at all. By 2012, of the 120 Rome-ratifiers,
sixty seven had passed complementarity legislation, while fifty two
had passed cooperation legislation. 130
Only recently have researchers tried to explain this variation.
Wayne Sandholtz develops a rule of law explanation for Rome

practices after ratifying it); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the
Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173-74 (2003)
(questioning the focus on ratification as the point of acceptance of human rights
norms); see also SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 80-81 (examining treaty engagement
and dropping a country from the analysis once it ratifies a treaty); see also Emilie
M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1373, 1377-78 (2005)
(recognizing that domestic practices do not always align with treaty ratification but
arguing that this aspect of compliance is only one part of the bigger picture).
128. Rome Statute, art. 89(1).
129. See id.; see also Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The
Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 767, 775-77 (2001) (including other amendments such as the inclusion of
“ICC” among the Extradition Act’s terms section and the elimination of some
grounds by which an executive might refuse surrender under the ICC).
130. See also COALITION FOR THE ICC, 2013 STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE
AROUND THE WORLD 9 (2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RomeStatute
Update_2013_web.pdf (providing national statistics on the complementarity and
cooperation legislation enacted to implement the Rome Statute); see generally
International Criminal Court: Updated Checklist for Effective Implementation,
AMNESTY INT’L (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?index
Number=ior53%2f009%2f2010&language=en (indicating complementarity and
cooperation requirements under the Rome Statute and recommending an
implementation checklist to effectively balance the ICC with national courts).
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Statute implementation. 131 Implementing legislation represents an
opportunity cost, given the financial and political resources invested
in legal reforms and enforcement cost, and because the legislation
provides the legal infrastructure for the prosecution of domestic
officials. According to Sandholtz, the states that are willing to pay
these costs are those that value and uphold the rule of law
domestically. Because the Rome Statute contributes to the realization
of an international rule of law, political elites in countries where the
rule of law is strong will see the ICC project as consistent with their
national norms and values.
Sandholtz’s statistical analysis of legislation enactment, as well as
anecdotal evidence elsewhere, 132 shows that Rome Statute
membership can lead to domestic legal change; however, this is
conditional on other variables that would seem to indicate state
quickened willingness to support the Court, such as rule of law, level
of democracy, and type of legal system. By itself, implementation
would not amount to much more than bringing a state’s domestic
statutes more in line with international criminal law. However, under
certain conditions, these norms can have more concrete effects. 133
For example, although Sudan’s President Al-Bashir remains at large,
his indictment has reduced his mobility. Last year, he was prevented
from leaving South Africa after the Southern African Litigation
Center filed a complaint before a High Court demanding his arrest in
accordance with South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute
Act 27 of 2002 134 Similarly, when visiting Nigeria in 2013, Bashir
131. See Wayne Sandholtz, Implementing the International Criminal Court,
APSA 2014 ANNUAL MEETING PAPER 1, 36 (2014) (finding that a more democratic
country is more likely to enact legislation implementing the treaty but is not
necessarily considered a ‘low-cost’ implementer).
132. See generally International Criminal Court: Updated Checklist for
Effective Implementation, supra note 132 (listing requirements for effective
implementation of complementarity and cooperation legislation); see generally
Triffterer, supra note 126, at 1-5 (emphasizing the importance of local
implementation legislation for the Rome Statute and the ICC).
133. See generally SIMMONS, supra note 43, at 12-14 (arguing that treaties
usefully solidify the government’s focus by revealing the gap between current
behaviors and the treaty provision standard of behavior).
134. South Africa/Sudan: Seeking Implementation of ICC Arrest Warrant for
President Bashir, SOUTH AFRICAN LITIG. CTR. (2016), http://www.southern
africalitigationcentre.org/cases/ongoing-cases/south-africasudan-seekingimplementation-of-icc-arrest-warrant-for-president-bashir/
(detailing
events
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had to abruptly cut his trip short when activist lawyers began
mobilizing to demand his arrest in court. 135
The Al-Bashir example is evidence of Court weakness because he
has not been apprehended. However, it is also evidence of something
else: the increasing necessity of accounting for international legal
norms when conducting affairs of state. As implementing legislation
continues to pass, amassing in countries around the world, the
jurisdictional net of the ICC widens. This could very well have longterm effects as time goes on. Next, we review the evidence on the
consequences of further ICC involvement, both at the preliminary
examination and investigation stages. A variety of literature seems to
indicate that when state willingness to support the ICC and
commitment to accountability weakens, a more active role by ICC
officials could lead to domestic legal and political changes.

B. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA
Colombia is a case that demonstrates the power of ICC actors to
monitor a conflict situation, and steward the application of law in a
country that has passed complementarity legislation. The internal
armed conflict in Colombia goes back over five decades and
throughout that time multiple armed groups have taken part in the
hostilities. The largest groups with the most continuous participation
have been the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN),
and the right-wing paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (AUC). The effects of the conflict reached a mass scale.
Official figures for the 1964 and 2007 period report 95,000 armed
conflict-related casualties, 51,530 kidnappings, 24,579 terrorist acts
and 4,499 massacres. The number of displaced persons ranges
between 3 and 4.6 million, making of Colombia the country with the
second-most displaced individuals, surpassed only by Sudan. 136
leading up to the government’s appeal to the Constitutional Court of the ruling that
the government’s failure to arrest President Bashir was unlawful).
135. Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bishir of Sudan to Avoid Arrest is
Tested in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/15/world/africa/bashir-sudan-international-criminal-court-southafrica.html (describing how Bashir’s case may be a test of the ICC’s relevance to
the African continent).
136. See KAI AMBOS, THE COLUMBIAN PEACE PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
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Colombia ratified the Rome Statute on 5 August 2002. Together
with France, Colombia was the only ratifier that made use of article
124, which allows ratifying countries to issue a declaration delaying
the Court’s jurisdiction for war crimes for seven years. This meant
that while the ICC has jurisdiction for two of the core crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity, committed since November
2002, it can only prosecute war crimes committed after November
2009.
The situation in Colombia has been under preliminary examination
since 2004, although the examination only became public in 2006.137
The first step was to assess subject matter jurisdiction, that is,
whether crimes under ICC jurisdiction were being committed. Given
the scale of the conflict, it did not take long for the Prosecutor to
reach that conclusion and the effort moved towards the admissibility
question. That is, was Colombia conducting genuine prosecutions
that would satisfy the complementarity principle?
What follows is not a legal assessment of whether this particular
policy passes the complementarity test or not. 138 This is an analysis
of the political construction of a particular scheme of judicial
accountability involving various stakeholders: the parties to the
conflict, the ICC and civil society. We show how the OTP’s strategy
was not to play a passive part of evaluating complementarity in order
to determine whether to step in or not. Even if taking a less salient
role, it became an important part in the construction of an
accountability process that by design would keep the Court away.
The OTP strategy was to make itself unnecessary. It did so by
pressing for specific provisions in the peace agreement that would
satisfy the Rome Statute requirements. During these three years the
OTP conducted at least five missions to Colombia and has consulted
COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN INDUCTIVE
SITUATION BASED APPROACH 52 (2010) (listing internal displacement, forced
disappearances, torture, and indiscriminate attacks among the factors that
contribute to the gravity of the systemic character of crimes in Columbia).
137. See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR ¶ 61-64 (2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E49C8-445D-8C13-F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPReportonPreliminary
Examinations13December2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Preliminary Report].
138. See generally AMBOS, supra note 136, at 37-39 (defining the
complementarity test and the preliminary steps that must be satisfied before
applying it).
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with Colombian officials regularly. 139
The Colombian government has attempted multiple peace
processes involving different accountability schemes for human
rights abuses. We will focus on the most recent of these policies, the
Special Peace Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz) of
2015 that is part of the agreement that resulted from three years of
peace negotiations between the government and the FARC in
Havana, Cuba.
Early on, the question of accountability appeared as one of the
thorniest issues to be resolved. The government got caught between
demands from the ICC 140 and transnational NGOs 141 that it comply
with its international obligations to punish the gravest crimes, and
the FARC’s expectation that the resulting legal framework would
include amnesties and alternative sentencing. 142 On the same month
the talks began, the ICC Prosecutor released and interim report
which made clear that the focus of the examination would be on the
proper prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV),
forced displacement, and the practice of “false positives.” 143 This
would become a normal practice of the OTP during the following

139. See generally Colombia, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (last visited
October 12, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia (reporting the ongoing
preliminary examination being conducted in Columbia in relation to alleged crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and national proceedings regarding these crimes).
140. CPI: “Cualquier proceso de paz debe ser compatible con el Estatuto de
Roma,” AMBITOJURIDICO.COM (April 19, 2013), http://www.ambitojuridico.com/
BancoConocimiento/Laboral-y-Seguridad-Social/noti-130419-15-cpi-cualquierproceso-de-paz-debe-ser-compatible-con-el-estatuto-de-roma.
141. Así hablaron defensores y detractores del Marco Jurídico para la Paz,
AMBITOJURIDICO.COM (August 27, 2013), http://www.ambitojuridico.com/
BancoConocimiento/Constitucional-y-Derechos-Humanos/noti20130828-01-asihablaron-defensores-y-detractores-del-marco-juridico-para-la-paz.
142. Marco para la Paz no puede contemplar amnistías e indultos a miembros
de las Farc, EL PAÍS (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/
noticias/marco-para-paz-puede-contemplar-amnistias-e-indultos-miembros-farc.
143. See On Their Watch: Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility for
False Positive Killings in Colombia, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (June 24, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/24/their-watch/evidence-sen
ior-army-officers-responsibility-false-positive-killings [hereinafter On Their
Watch] (defining ‘false positives’ as the name given to a particular practice by
sectors of the Colombian Armed Forces who, under pressure by superior officials
to show results, would stage operations against guerrilla fighters in which most of
the casualties were actually civilians).
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years – to constantly remind the Colombian authorities that although
national proceedings might be ongoing, those cannot just cover
certain categories of crimes while ignoring others. 144
The final agreement refers to the Rome Statute in multiple parts.
The accountability provisions grant amnesties but preclude them
from benefiting those responsible for the most serious crimes, those
under ICC jurisdiction. It also creates a special jurisdiction with its
own judges. Most of the magistrates will be Colombian nationals, but
a minority of foreigners is allowed to participate. 145 Small decisions
like this one, including making the text of the agreement available in
English, suggest that Colombian authorities are interested in
projecting this last transitional justice effort to an international
audience.
The agreed sentencing scheme benefits individuals that come
forward with their crimes and contribute to the establishing of truth.
Those who recognize responsibilities for serious crimes will receive
sentences between five and eight years. Those who do not will be
prosecuted in a conventional criminal trial and could face sentences
of up to twenty years. Sentencing was one of the issues the ICC
pressed the most. In May 2015, Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart
recognized that although states have considerable discretion
regarding the type and length of sentences they impose, penalties
need to be congruent with the goals of the Rome Statute in terms of
public condemnation, acknowledgement of victims’ suffering, and
deterrence. The OTP made this position clear to the Colombian
government. Declared Stewart,
This was done confidentially and in advance of formal negotiations on the
sentencing issue in the peace talks. . . . The step was prompted by our
concern to alert the national authorities to our interpretation of the

144. See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, 37-38 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep2015-Eng.pdf [2015 Preliminary Report] (reporting the OTP’s follow-up with the
national government’s proceedings in false positive cases and outlining the steps
OTP has taken to ensure the national authority’s statements regarding active
investigations of cases are supported by sufficient evidence).
145. Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una
Paz Estable y Duradera, Colom.-Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
art. 5.1.2 par. 65 (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/
sites/default/files/24_08_2016acuerdofinalfinalfinal-1472094587.pdf.
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provisions of the Rome Statute in a timely way, and not after the fact. 146

After the agreement was publicized, the Office released a
statement noting that it was pleased with the exclusion of amnesties
for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 147 At the same time, the
largest transnational NGOs did not express the same enthusiasm for
the agreement. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch criticized the Special Peace Jurisdiction for its ambiguity and
omissions, which could lead to individuals responsible for serious
crimes not serving any jail time at all. 148
The evidence demonstrates that the ICC clearly impacted the most
146. James Stewart, Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of the
International Criminal Court, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 11 (May 13,
2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-stat-13-05-2015-ENG.pdf
(illustrating the need for communication between ICC and national officials).
147. See Statement of the Prosecutor on the Agreement on the Creation of a
Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_stat_24-092015 [hereinafter Statement of the Prosecutor] (“I note with optimism that the
agreement excludes the granting of any amnesty for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and is designed, amongst others, to end impunity for the most serious
crimes.”).
148. Both organizations are centrally concerned with the ability of the justice
system to impose sentences on those confessed human rights violators. The final
peace agreement prescribes alternative sentences for less egregious acts,
designated as political and other related crimes by a proposed Amnesty Law,
foreclosing jail time in circumstances not connected to “grave violations of
domestic and international human rights.” Those that admitted criminal
responsibility for serious crimes would receive sentences between five and eight
years of “effective restriction of personal liberty” and requiring participation in
restorative projects to aid victims. They argue that application of these alternative
sentences is not proportional to the gravity of the crimes and Colombia would be in
violation of their international legal obligations to punish atrocities. See Human
Rights Watch Analysis of Colombia-FARC Agreement, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec.
21, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/21/human-rights-watch-analysiscolombia-farc-agreement; see also Amnesty International Report 2015/16: The
State of the World’s Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L 123 (2016),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/AIR15_English.PDF (suggesting that a primary
concern is alternative sentencing, where individuals who admitted criminal
responsibility for serious crimes would receive sentences between five and eight
years, but the text of the agreement also allows for sanctions not including jail
time, such as five to eight years of participating in restorative projects to aid
victims; further arguing that if Colombia applies sanctions not proportional to the
gravity of the crimes then it would be in violation of international legal obligations
to punish atrocities).

DANCY- FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS (DO NOT DELETE)

692

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

2/23/2017 12:35 PM

[32:3

recent effort to provide accountability for human rights violations in
Colombia, the Special Peace Jurisdiction. The ICC Prosecution made
itself consequential by pressuring the Colombian government to
create the conditions that would keep the OTP from a full
investigation. Arguments about the ‘shadow of the ICC’, which have
been regularly made by supporters of the ICC, do not properly
capture the kind of involvement the Court has had, at least in the
Colombia case. The idea that government officials have been
negotiating the peace agreement in the shadow of the Court suggests
a much more static role by the OTP and exogenous role. Government
officials did not operate in the shadow of the ICC; they operated face
to face with Court members.
It cannot be argued that the ICC had only positive effects on the
Colombian peace process. There has been criticism on many fronts.
One is that the OTP’s narrow focus on complementarity and its
inability to consider “gender biases inherent in laws in each state that
interfere with the investigation and prosecution of crimes of sexual
violence.” 149 Another type of criticism recognizes the positive effects
the ICC had on legal reforms and capacity building, but concludes
that the perpetual examining role of the ICC cannot go on forever.
The OTP created a ‘no-win’ situation in which if the preliminary
examination closes, forces pushing for broad accountability would
weaken. If the examination advances onto a full investigation, it
would antagonize national institutions and diminish the progress
achieved so far. And if the situation remains under preliminary
examination, the OTP will lose its capacity to influence the political
process given that the threat of the investigation would lose
credibility. 150 It should be noted, however, that this argument
surfaced in 2011, and the OTP has still found ways to influence the
accountability component of the latest peace agreement.
It is clear that the ICC did not cause the Special Peace Jurisdiction.
In other words, had the ICC refrained from conducting a preliminary
examination in Colombia, an accountability component would likely
149. Louise Chappell et al., The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity:
Lessons from the International Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations in
Guinea and Colombia, 7 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 455, 473 (2013).
150. Alejandro Chehtman, The Impact of the ICC in Colombia: Positive
Complementarity on Trial, DOMAC 59 (2011), http://www.domac.is/media/
domac-skjol/Domac-17-AC.pdf.
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still exist in the peace agreement. However, those provisions would
have looked different; therefore, OTP involvement changed the
contours of the accountability provisions themselves. There is
evidence to suggest this counterfactual is plausible. Putting an end to
the fifty-year-old conflict has always been in the agenda of President
Santos; however, the way in which he would pursue peace and
justice together was not clear at the beginning of his presidency. For
example, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly of
2012, Santos announced the beginning of peace talks, but made
absolutely no reference to accountability measures. 151 His speech
from 2015, given days after the Special Peace Jurisdiction was
adopted, is dominated by the post-conflict justice theme. This change
cannot be understood without the participation of the ICC. However,
as Santos noted in his last General Assembly appearance, Colombia
is achieving “the maximum of justice that allows us to transit
towards peace.” 152 That is, the ICC was able to exert its influence
because Colombia’s political actors, interested perhaps in
international validation and legitimacy, provided the Court with the
space to do so. The OTP could have pressed for an even more
rigorous accountability mechanism, with harsher and longer
sentences, but that could have proved too costly for the government
if it had compromised its ability to deliver on peace.
The last years of the Colombian peace process show how the
Rome Statute structured the context of peace negotiations in a way
that certain accountability policies, most notably amnesties and
pardons for serious crimes, are off limits for negotiators. In
accordance with the quantitative evidence presented above,
amnesties are still implemented in conflict termination. However, the
purpose of the ICC in Colombia was to keep those policies within
certain legal boundaries. In this sense, a parallel could be drawn with
the 1999 Lomé Accord for Sierra Leone, an agreement struck in a
very different stage of international criminal justice. The Lomé
Accord determined the cessation of over ten years of hostilities and a
power-sharing scheme between the Sierra Leone government and the

151. U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A67/PV.10
(Sept. 26, 2012).
152. U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess., 16th plen. mtg., at 30-32, U.N. Doc. A/70/PV.16
(Sept. 29, 2015).
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opposing Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”). 153 The accountability
provisions of the agreement amount to what is known as a blanket
amnesty, an unconditional shield from prosecution granted to all
warring parties. 154
That the final deal would contain amnesties had been decided
upon even before the peace talks started. As the talks continued, civil
society tried to engage the government on this question, but received
little substantive information. It was not immediately clear to UN
representative Francis Okello that the blanket amnesty and pardon
for crimes of the war would be a problem in relation to UN policy. 155
The day before the signing of the Accord, Okello received orders
from New York not to sign the agreement precisely because it
granted a blanket amnesty. However, the final decision was not to
stand in the way and upon signing the agreement, the UN
representative wrote a disclaimer in the margins stating that
according to the UN’s understanding, the amnesty would not apply
to serious crimes under international law. The note read, “the United
Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the
Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.” 156
It is clear how the Lomé Accord was negotiated in a very different
context from the one in which the Colombian peace process
developed, both legally and politically. In legal terms, the existence
of the Rome Statute and its full force over Colombia after article 124
reservations expired provide clear rules in relation to amnesties. In
the Sierra Leone case, the issue of the legal relationship between the
amnesty articles of the Lomé Accord and the Special Court for Sierra
153. See JEFFERY, supra note 65, at 118.
154. See Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the
Justice Challenge, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN
DIALOGUE 5 (Dec. 1, 2007), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55192/SierraLeone
Reportrevise_1207.pdf [hereinafter Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone] (discussing
the strong international condemnation of Sierra Leone’s blanket amnesty
provisions).
155. Priscilla Hayner, The International Role in Justice and peacemaking in
Sierra Leone, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (Nov. 2013),
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_SierraLeone.pdf [hereinafter International Role in
Justice].
156. JEFFERY, supra note 65, at 118.
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Leone’s statute arose in the form of admissibility challenges. The
Special Court dismissed the challenges by deciding that the Lomé
amnesties were contrary to international customary law. However,
given the absence of relevant treaty law applicable to Sierra Leone
that imposed a duty to prosecute, 157 the Special Court recurred to
international custom, taking an approach that some commentators
considered to be odd. 158 In terms of the political differences, the
active role played by ICC representatives early on contrasts sharply
with that of the UN officials that only brought up the amnesty issue
at the very end of the Lomé negotiations, risking the adoption of the
entire deal.
This review of the Colombia case shows how preliminary
examinations provide spaces for ICC officials to influence political
processes on the ground. The next step is to look into the evidence
arising from situations under investigation to see what kinds of
effects investigations have given the higher level of scrutiny and
prosecutorial powers they entail.

C. INVESTIGATION: THE CASES OF UGANDA AND DRC
Uganda and DRC, the two countries with the longest history of
ICC investigation after both onsets in 2004, provide evidence of
what we have elsewhere called unintended positive
complementarity. 159 With this concept, we refer to a diffuse effect of
the ICC on judicial activity in terms of an increase in municipal
prosecutions of state agents for all human rights crimes, not just trials
157. See Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International
Humanitarian Law: The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 86 IRRC 837, 849 (Dec. 2004) (mentioning that Common Article 3 of the
Geneva conventions, pertaining to non-international armed conflict, contains no
explicit obligation to prosecute or extradite; further discussing the inapplicability
of the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention).
158. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 145, 159-60 (2004-2005) [hereinafter Amnesty, the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission] (quoting the Appeals Chamber’s
finding of a non-violation of the Lomé agreement, and stating that it is “certainly
an odd statement from the Special Court”).
159. E.g., Dancy & Montal, supra note 100, at 5-7 (defining unintended
positive complementarity as “general causal effects” of the ICC, such as increasing
domestic prosecutions for all human rights crimes, and identifying Uganda and the
DRC as examples of this).
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of state and rebel leaders specifically for atrocity crimes. Although
the policy of positive complementarity has been part of the OTP
repertoire for years, the effect we find is unintended from the
Prosecutor’s policy in two main ways. 160 First, the ICC has not
openly promoted general domestic accountability in states targeted
for intervention; instead, it has tended to focus on atrocity crimes
arising from the situations that led to the Court’s involvement.
Second, in this notion of positive complementarity, increases in
domestic judicial activity does not result from state cooperation but
from latent political struggles between ruling and reformer coalitions
that ICC involvement exacerbates.
The possibility of an increase in the level of domestic
prosecutorial activity as a result of an investigation, although one of
the goals of the whole Rome Statute system, has been discounted by
critical scholars. Sarah Nouwen’s thoroughly researched book argues
that while ICC intervention has invigorated debates around legal
justice in Uganda, the actual operation of the courts has remained
limited, and Ugandan courts have not effectively prosecuted highprofile cases of atrocity crimes. 161 The main reason behind this is a
deficit of political will: “Neither ICC intervention nor
complementarity reduces the often insuperable loyalty costs that
domestic proceedings would incur.” 162 Nouwen’s account is no doubt
accurate, but at the same time it stops short of examining the
possibility that ICC intervention has more diffuse and unintended
legal effects.
Most of the work on positive complementarity, which like
Nouwen’s has come to negative findings, focuses on whether there is
a direct connection between ICC involvement and state-led
proceedings, through leveraging or the sharing of evidence, for those

160. See Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, ICC: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 4
(2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf
(identifying
positive complementarity as one of the four fundamental principles of ICC
prosecutorial strategy).
161. SARAH M.H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND
SUDAN (2013).
162. Id. at 12.
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crimes specifically under ICC jurisdiction. 163 However, statistical
analysis of determinants of all domestic human rights prosecutions in
African states from 1980 through 2011 shows that a country subject
to an ICC investigation tends to have roughly three times more trials
per year than other African countries without ICC involvement, and
this effect holds even when we account for confounding factors like
presence of human rights NGOs, judicial independence, democratic
transition and foreign aid earmarked for civil society and capacitybuilding. Interestingly, preliminary examinations do not have this
effect on domestic judicial responsiveness; only full-fledged
investigations do. 164
The mechanisms driving this effect rely on legal differences
between preliminary examinations and investigations. These sit at
the heart of the political clashes between state actors favoring
impunity and the reforming opposition that pushes for accountability.
Preliminary examinations do not carry high costs for targeted states
since the Court is not empowered to do much more than collect
information. However, an official ICC investigation means the
almost certain prosecution of a country’s nationals for serious
crimes. Of all the stages of ICC involvement, the official
investigation is the most critical from a reputational point of view
because at this point state agents can be put on the “wanted by the
ICC” list, which serves as an international status marker. At the same
time, state authorities are put in an uncomfortable position since they
are expected to cooperate in the punishment of state agents that are
part of its own ranks.

163. See Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The
Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE
HUM. RTS. DEV. J. 205, 210 (2011) (stating the objectives of research into
complementarity as a search for a direct link between ICC preliminary
examination and domestic accountability).
164. See Dancy & Montal, supra note 100, at 46 (“ . . . when controlling for
confounding factors, preliminary examinations are not associated with increased
prosecutions, but ICC investigations are.”)
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Figure 5. Number of human rights prosecutions in Uganda 165

Figure 6. Number of human rights prosecutions in DRC 166

165. See Records: Uganda, TRANSITIONAL JUST. RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE,
https://transitionaljusticedata.com/browse/index/Browse.countryid:121 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2016) (select “Domestic Criminal Prosecutions” and filter by “Year”)
(listing domestic criminal prosecutions in Uganda from 1972 to 2011).
166. See Records: Congo, Democratic Republic of the, TRANSITIONAL JUST.
RESEARCH
COLLABORATIVE,
https://transitionaljusticedata.com/browse/index/Browse.countryid:26
(select
“Domestic Criminal Prosecutions” and filter by “Year”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2016)
(listing domestic criminal prosecutions in the DRC from 1978 to 2011).

DANCY- FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/23/2017 12:35 PM

FROM LAW VERSUS POLITICS TO LAW IN POLITICS

699

Amid this sensitive moment for the regime, which is attempting to
avoid reputational losses, reformers engage in three strategies we
term demand-making, capacity-building, and gap-filling litigation.
The reforming opposition consists of coalitions of activists and
attorneys linked in with transnational NGOs along with their allies
inside the system like progressive legislators, ministers, and judges.
Demand-making includes actions like issuing statements about the
reticence of government officials to support local human rights
responses, along with a number of calls for more domestic judicial
empowerment. Capacity-building means participating in legal
conferences, training programs, and human rights education
initiatives. For example, in 2009 alone the Ugandan Foundation for
Human Rights Initiative (“FHRI”), which maintains ties with
western INGOs and donors, trained a total of 284 members of
community-based organization in human rights and gender-based
violence. 167 Similarly in DRC, Avocats Sans Frontières (“ASF”) and
the American Bar Association (ABA) have carried out different
projects in the area of access to justice including training magistrates
and other local NGOs.
Making demands and building capacity, though, do not themselves
mobilize domestic courts. For this, groups wishing for change pursue
litigation in domestic courts themselves. For example, the Ugandan
FHRI is an organization with a wide interest in legal accountability
and access to justice that exceeds the situation in Northern Uganda.
The trend in cases received by the FHRI shows a remarkable
increase after the opening of the ICC investigation in 2004 and it is
suggestive of an increase in NGOs’ efforts to promote access to
justice during that period. 168 In DRC, international NGO involvement
in gap-filling litigation rose to the point of providing the physical
courts in which trials could take place. Between 2009 and 2012 these
mobile courts, which are established for a specific period of time in
remote areas, provided the setting for twenty court sessions and
heard 382 cases that resulted in 286 convictions and sixty-seven
167. See 2009 Annual Report, FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE 5557 (2010), http://www.fhri.or.ug/index.php/2015-07-22-14-08-32/annual-reports/
23-annual-report-2009/file (discussing different capacity building courses that
FHRI held for community organizations during 2009).
168. See id. at 41 (listing a yearly increase in cases from 2004 to 2009, from
223 to 378).
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acquittals. 169 As Lake argues, the actions of anti-impunity groups
created a situation where “complex functions of domestic
governance, such as the production of high quality judicial decisions
by domestic courts, are able to persist, even flourish, in an area
where the state is characterized by extreme fragility and
weakness.” 170
Figures 5 and 6 chart data on human rights prosecutions to show
that a significant increase in trials occurred in Uganda and the DRC
following ICC investigation. Because reforming coalitions pursue
these strategies in a moment when the government is sensitive to
international attention, they are more likely to succeed at pressuring
the courts to pursue criminal cases without fear of reprisal. The result
is a significant increase in domestic human rights prosecutions—an
unintended byproduct of ICC investigations that does not look like
the positive complementarity that OTP officials originally
envisioned.

D. NON-PARTY STATES AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE CASES OF
INDONESIA AND INDIA
The last place where we should expect the ICC to have any effect
should be non-party states that are under no form of scrutiny by the
Court. However, there is evidence of ICC legal impact even in such
cases. India and Indonesia are non-party states that mimicked Rome
Statute language in their own legislation even though they are under
no obligation to implement it.
Differently from state parties that are expected to implement the
entire Rome Statute upon ratification, non-members need not pursue
such legislation. There is, however, evidence of partial incorporation
when political openings in these states allow activists and other
progressive actors to bring municipal legislation more in line with
international standards. That international treaties influence domestic

169. Open Society Foundations. (2013). Justice in DRC. Mobile Courts Combat
Rape and Impunity in Eastern Congo, p. 7. (https://www.opensociety
foundations.org/sites/default/files/justice-drc-20130114.pdf)
170. Milli Lake, Organizing Hypocrisy: Providing Legal Accountability for
Human Rights Violations in Areas of Limited Statehood, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 515,
515 (2014) [hereinafter Organizing Hypocrisy].
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legislation should not come as a surprise 171 since what is particular
about the Rome Statute is that it is a highly progressive legal
instrument. Additionally, the accompanying Elements of the Crimes
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence convey a level of specificity
that reduces states’ space for insincere adoption of legal norms that
are easily interpreted in self-serving ways.
Decided in 2004, Sakshi v. Union of India 172 was an important case
for India’s judicial treatment of sexual and gender-based violence.
The women’s rights NGO Sakshi petitioned the Supreme Court to
affirm a broader definition of rape. Although the Court upheld the
traditional conservative definition, it recognized that it is one
“contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual abuse and
violence all over the world” and urged the legislature to make
changes to criminal laws governing sexual violence. 173 This created
momentum for women’s rights groups, which pursued intense
advocacy on this definitional issue. At a time when important
stakeholders from the judiciary and civil society were arguing for
change towards more correspondence with international standards,
the Rome Statute was the natural source for an updated definition.
The largest advocacy group, the National Commission for
Women, considered “the Rome Statute definition as being at the
forefront of the international feminist movement.” 174 To import
language from the ICC Statute means to draw from “the most
progressive definition of rape included to date in any international
treaty.” 175 The Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2006 lifted
the language directly from the Rome Statute Elements of the Crimes
for its definitions of rape and consent, making Indian municipal law
much more progressive and changing the entire legal infrastructure
171. See SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 126 (illustrating the causal relevance of
treaties as a formal institution through the example of international human rights
treaties, which create stakeholders domestically and generate huge impacts on the
relationships between a government and its citizens).
172. Sakshi v. India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, ¶ 35 (India) (identifying the cases of
child abuse and rape as advancing the “cause of justice” and being “in the larger
interest of society”).
173. Sakshi v. India, ¶ 4.
174. Milli Lake, Realizing Complementarity: Bridging the gap between
international law and domestic jurisdictions, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Realizing
Complementarity].
175. Id. at 5.
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used in prosecutions for rape. India remains outside the ICC,
meaning rape could only be prosecuted as an ordinary crime instead
as a crime against humanity or war crime. Still, this domestic
transformation shows “an important aspect of complementarity
practiced through changing the way that the crime of rape is
conceptualized legally and socially.” 176
Another example of unexpected legal effects of the Rome Statute
takes place in Indonesia. In 2002, Indonesia’s government expressed
it willingness to become a member of the Rome Statute before 2009,
and after failing to do so, it announced again its disposition to join,
this time before 2014. Although it participates from the Assembly of
State Parties as an observer, to this date Indonesia remains outside of
the ICC, and observers point to the armed forces as the strongest
opposition to ratification because of fear of prosecution against its
own high ranks. 177
Despite its non-member status, the Rome Statute system still
influenced Indonesia domestic legal change to some extent. In 1999,
Indonesia passed the Law on Human Rights as a breach with former
President Suharto’s legacy of human rights violations. This law
called for the creation of a special jurisdiction and a year later, the
legislature passed the complementing Law on Human Rights Courts.
The law draws heavily from the Rome Statute and incorporates the
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity as well as the
principle of command responsibility. The commentary
accompanying the legislation acknowledges that some articles were
taken entirely from the Statute of the ICC. 178 At the same time, and
again due to military opposition, the law left war crimes outside its
subject matter. 179 For this and other reasons, Amnesty International
has voiced its concern with the law’s shortcomings that make it

176. Id. at 20.
177. See Lasse Schuldt, Southeast Asian Hesitation: ASEAN Countries and the
International Criminal Court, 16 GER. L.J. 75, 85 (2015).
178. See, e.g., Suzannah Linton, Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, 10
SING. Y.B.I.L. 199, 215 (2007) (pointing to Article 9(h) as an example of one
taken directly from the Statute of the ICC).
179. See Amrita Kapur, Asian Values v. The Paper Tiger: Dismantling the
Threat to Asian Values Posed by the International Criminal Court, 11 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 1059, 1071-72 (2013).
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inconsistent with international standards. 180 Similarly, the
Commission of Experts for East Timor appointed by the UN
Secretary General criticized the law to the extent that it differed from
the Rome Statute. 181
These two cases show how the Statute of the ICC has become the
international standard for human rights legislation. When an opening
appears to push for expansive human rights norms, as with the
Sakshi decision in India or the post-Suharto reforms in Indonesia,
stakeholders can demand to bring the national legislation up to date
with international standards. In so doing, they can produce some of
the most progressive pieces of international law at hand. Indonesia’s
importation of Statute crimes has been incomplete, leaving war
crimes aside; as unsatisfying as this might be, we should remember
that this also means that it was not possible to adopt hollow legal
rules regulating war crimes in an attempt to please international
audiences. Another consequence of non-ICC membership is that
India’s progressive rape definition could not be prosecuted as war
crimes or crimes against humanity, just as ordinary crime. However,
the India example shows how Rome Statute-inspired legal changes
short of full implementation can still have significant consequences
for domestic legal systems.

E. DISCUSSION
We found earlier that, when it comes to conflict prevention, the
ICC appears more important for what it is than what it does. In the
case of legal change, we find both: legal change is inspired by the
Rome Statute itself, and by direct consultation and monitoring on the
part of the Court. Because of the Court’s limited resources to
intervene in multiple places, the effects that come from its direct

180. See Amnesty International’s Comments on the Law of Human Rights
Courts (Law No.26/2000), AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 9, 2001), https://
www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/128000/asa210052001en.pdf [hereinafter
Amnesty International’s Comments] (suggesting that the government review the
legislation, and identifying, for example, that there is no provision prohibiting the
admissibility of statements obtained via torture).
181. See Linton, supra note 178, at 15 (comparing the Indonesian law, which
obligates commanders to act only when unlawful acts are occurring or just after the
acts occurred, with international law, which requires commanders to prevent
international acts).
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involvement, as in the cases of Colombia, DRC and Uganda, are
important but restricted to those strategic environments. The
discussion in this last section, however, result from the particular
status of the Rome Statute as an international standard. In this regard,
we should only expect more influence in the future as its place in the
world’s legal architecture solidifies. Evidence from Indonesia and
India supports this idea by showing how the Rome Statute has a
gravitational pull that affects even some non-party states.
The opening of the Rome Statute era deeply transformed
international standards, mostly due to an unprecedented specificity
that remove the possibility of state manipulation as well as its heavy
reliance on national jurisdictions. That is, the Statute demands states
to amend their national laws in order to comply with their obligations
and at the same time it provides them with the elements to do so
with. As Rome Statute definitions get entrenched as international
standards, they become ‘all-or-nothing’ legal norms. There is less
space for insincere talk when states reduced margins for emptying
international human rights norms of consequential meaning.

V. CONCLUSION
1n 1872, Swiss lawyer Gustave Moynier called for criminal courts
to enforce the first Geneva Conventions. 182 It took 130 years later for
a fully operational International Criminal Court to get up and
running. The Court is imperfect, and political realists criticize it
either for being unable to maintain the separation between legal and
political spheres, or oppositely, for failing to engage the political
consequences of its actions. It is either too political or too apolitical,
too consequentialist or too normative. So it goes. While the Court
does and should stand for the high standards embodied in
international criminal law, we do not see the point in denying that the
Court’s work is enmeshed in the realities of practice. In the words of
Judith Shklar, “the morality of justice” is “not above the political
world but in its very midst.” 183 Instead, we seek to gauge the
influence that the Court actually has in the political world.
Our stock-taking exercise shows that the Court, despite setbacks,

182. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 20.
183. SHKLAR, supra note 26, at 123.
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has a significant role to play. With regard to violence prevention, the
ICC is on balance neither futile nor perverse, as deterrence theorists
tend to argue. Ratification of the Rome Statute is associated with a
higher probability that civil wars will end with negotiation, and in
specific instances it has been used to marginalize violent opposition
groups. Ratification is also correlated with less repressive violence,
fewer incidents of mass killing of civilians, and fewer onsets of civil
war. The newest scientific research suggests that these correlations
are attributable to the social effects of the Court. Fearing the loss of
status and support that comes from ICC attention, leaders within the
jurisdiction of the Court improve their behavior. Critically, though,
the ICC’s direct involvement in specific situations does not have
generalizable pacifying effects. It is sometimes associated with the
end of wars, and sometimes not. Likewise, it sometimes is associated
with less violence against civilians, and sometimes not. On this basis,
we should be aware of grandiose generalizations about the Court’s
involvements. The impact of its interventions varies by circumstance.
With regard to legal change, we discover that the Rome Statute
and Court involvement in countries has “jurisgenerative” properties
at the domestic level. 184 Rome ratifiers change their laws to fit the
standards of the Court, but unexpectedly, so too do non-ratifiers like
India and Indonesia. Under extended preliminary examination,
Colombia altered the course of its peace negotiations to move closer
to international standards. In Uganda and the DRC, ICC
investigation set in motion interaction between reformers and the
government in a way that has increased domestic criminal
prosecutions. Many of these impacts are unexpected, and the reason
is that the Court, for all of its faults, is becoming part of the domestic
political landscape. It is moving from a new Court to an indelible,
everyday institution. The reason is that the ideas it embodies, those
of the Rome Statute, edit the script in the domestic theater where law
and politics play out their drama.

184. See Benhabib, supra note 23, at 696 (defining ‘jurisgenerativity’ as “the
law’s capacity to create a normative universe of meaning that can often escape the
provenance of formal lawmaking”).

